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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
At the “beginning of 1940 the United States was being
enveloped In a rising spiral of general Inflation generated
from two separate but related sources.

In the first place,

monetary or fiscal inflation resulted because the Federal
Government converted its deficits into currency and bank
deposits to provide itself with funds for defense and war
expenditures*

Secondly, commodlty-priee inflation resulted

because the demand for civilian goods exceeded the supply
when American industry converted from the manufacture of
consumer goods to war materials, and in addition money be
came relatively plentiful because of the increase in produc
tion and income.^

The vast money supply and bank deposits

created by Government war financing which had increased

Commodity-price inflation and monetary inflation
are related because scarcity of commodities, with the volume
and circulation of money remaining the same, causes prices
to advance. 'Furthermore, large issues of money mean high
prices because the law of supply and, demand applies to money
as it does to every other commodity. When there is too much
money in relation to the volume of goods and services to be
exchanged, prices rise. In 1940 the increase in deposits
and currency caused by defense financing, and the shortage
of civilian goods as the result of an increase in Federal
Government purchases of consumer goods, accentuated the
pressures of inflation on the American economy.
Edwin W. Kemmerrer, The ABC of Inflation (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1942)7 p p . 7-14.
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demand and purchasing power, were held in check during the
war "by an elaborate harness of controls consisting of price
and wage ceilings, the excess profits tax, savings “
bond
drives, regulation of consumer and security credit, and
other Government regulations#2

The cessation of hostilities

and the subsequent return to a peacetime economy at the end
of 1945 confronted the Federal Government with the tremendous
problem, of keeping the forces of inflation under control.
X* PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study, devoted to postwar inflation in the United
States and proposals to control or retard inflation, Is made
with the purpose of finding answers to the following ques
tions *
■
(1)

Were the general credit control powers of the

Federal Reserve System adequate to prevent or substantially
retard inflation during the postwar period?
(2)

What measures would effect a shift of bank-held

Government securities to less inflationary holders, and what
would the effect have been in retarding inflation during the
postwar period?

%arr!ner Eccles, Hearings'Before the Joint Committee
on jthe Economic Report. 80th Congress, 1st Session, 1947,
(Washington, D. C*: United States Government Printing Office,
1948), p. 136.

3
(3)

How would a combination of anti-inflationary

measures, to be suggested later in the study, have assisted
in reducing inflationary pressures?
It is impossible to cover the large and complicated
field of both monetary and commodity-price Inflation within
the scope of this study.

The answers to these questions,

therefore, will concentrate on the monetary aspects of infla
tion.
With this limitation, the problem becomes a study of
(1) the measures conceived by the Board of Governors

of the

Federal Reserve System in 1946 to combat postwar Inflation;
(2) the anti-inflation suggestions proposed in 1946 by two
well-known economists and professors at Harvard University,
Sumner Slichter and Alvin Hansen; and (3) a combination of
the best proposals of the Board and the economists, in addi
tion to measures proposed by the writer.

An attempt

made to appraise the effectiveness of such a program

is then
if it

had been adopted by the Government in 1946.
II. ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY
The remainder of this study is organized as follows:
Chapter II serves to set the background of the problem
by recounting the evolution of the Federal Reserve System's
policies through 1945 and the expansion of the economy during
World War II.

4
Chapter III describee the attempt of the (fovemmeht
’to prevent inflation from 1946 through 1948.,
Chapter XV is devoted to the followingJ
(1) An analysis of the Federal Reserve's proposals
. to combat Inflation in 1946.
(2) An analysis of the anti-inflationary programs sug
gested by Professors Bumrer Bldohier and Alvin Hansen of
Harvard University in 1946.
Chapter V is a study of the effectiveness of an antiinflationary program consisting of measures selected from
those covered in Chapter IV and additional measures suggested
by the writer.
Chapter VI summarizes the study and states the con
clusions •

i

CHAPTER II
—

DEVELOPMENT OF CREDIT CONTROL, 1913-1945
Much has been written about the evolution of Federal

Reserve policy since its origin in 1913; and only a brief
review of the development of its major instruments of credit
control will be undertaken here.

The Federal Reserve System

during its brief existence has operated through two World Wars,
an unprecedented boom, a major depression, short sudden panics
in 1921 and 1937» and the current high price and expansion
period.
I. EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL RESERVE CREDIT
CONTROL INSTRUMENTS, 1913-1939
The original principles drafted by the authors of the
Federal Reserve Act are:

"the establishment of Federal Reserve

Banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of re
discounting commercial paper, and to establish a more effective
supervision of banking. "**“ The predominant view of the founders
of the Act was that control of the discount operations would
be a major factor in exercising a constant steadying influence
on credit conditions in the American economic system.^

^Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and Currency«
United States Senate, <>3rd Congress, 1st Session, 1913> Vol. 1.
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office,
1913), p* 6.
0
Karl R. Bopp, "Three Decades of Federal Reserve Policy,
Federal Reserve Policy (Baltimore, Md.: Waverly Press, 1947),
p. 2.

Discount Rate Control.

The Committee of Governors

was authorized to set the rate at which commercial paper
could be discounted at Reserve Banks, and therefore, create
the need to expand and contract credit.

Increasing the cost

of discounts presumably discourages unhealthy expansion and
decreasing the cost presumably encourages expansion of credit.
When they raise the rates, member banks earn less on their
notes if they discount them at the Reserve Banks, and they
will be less likely to discount paper.

The reverse of this

procedure, lowering rates, allows for better earnings.

How

ever, the initiative to discount more paper comes entirely
from the member banks.^
The first use of the discount rate as a measure of
control of the money market was in 1920 when the Reserve BankB
raised the rate from 4^ per cent to 7 per cent on rediscounted
notes.

This was considerably higher than the customer-bank

rate, but approximately 1 per cent lower than the prevailing
open market rate on prime commercial paper.

This program

assisted deflation slightly during the latter half of 1920.
After 1921, however, the Board failed to enforce penalty rates
to make borrowing from central banks unprofitable, and bank
credit expansion was not retarded.^

^Lorie Tarshis, The Elements of Economics (Cambridge,
Mass.: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1947), P • 309*
^Samuel Harris, Twenty Years of Federal Reserve Policy.
Vol. 1, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933),
pp. 40-42.

7
During the early and middle 1920*s the discount rate
fluotuated from

to 5| per cent and the total amount of

bills discounted at .the Reserve BankB ranged from 1,797 mil**
lion dollars In 1921 to 442 million in 1927-

In early 1929

there occurred a period of rapid expansion of credit accom
panied by overspeculation in the security market and the
discount rate was raised to 6 per cent to help effect this
booaw

With the subsequent rapid liquidation and unsettled

business conditions the discount rate was reduced from 5 per
cent in November 1929 to a low of l| per cent on May 8, 1931*^
This reduction did not encourage the banks to expand their
loans because of the abnormally high volume of excess reserves
held at the reserve banks.

The amount of discounted paper

declined to 7 million dollars in 1935 and remained at that
low and insignificant level through 1939*^

Rediscounting had

little significance as a controlling factor of bank lending
by the Reserve System during the latter half of the 1930’s
because of the large amount of excess reserves of member
banks, and it has ceased to be an effective method of control
ling bank lending.
tmmmwmv* ■

i

^Rudolph L. Weissman, The New Federal Reserve System
(New York: Harper and Brothers Inc., 1936), p p • 155-158.
^Federal Reserve Bulletin. Vol. 26, No. 2, (Washington^.
D. C., United States Government Printing Office, 1940),. p. 120.
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Open Market Operations*

To supplement the discounting

operations In the exercise of a steadying influence on credit
conditions the Committee of Governors was to determine the
open market operations1of the Reserve Banks.

The open market

operations objective is to buy and sell Government securities
.and other obligations in the open market to affect member
banks1 lending ability.

The Reserve Banks buy and sell secur-

ities to and from the public or, member banks*

When they buy

In the market from member banks it has the effect of enlarging
the reserves of member banks at the Reserve Banks and increases
their ability to lend, but if the purchases are made from the
public the member bank's deposits grow correspondingly to the
amount of the deposit at the Reserve Banks.

They are furnished

additional reserves, but not as large as when the purchases
are direct from member banks, because member banks’ deposits
as well as reserves are increased.

The contraction of loans

can be. accomplished by the sale of securities to member banks
or individuals resulting in the reserve at the Reserve Banks
being decreased and forcing the member banks to call in their
loans, or refuse to renew loans, or liquidate investments to
meet the deficit at the Reserve Banks.?

Thus the actual re

serves can be affected by the open market operations as
determined by the Committee.

Their policies also affect the

?Tarshls, op* clt., p. 30?.

9
amount of money in circulation* increasing it when they buy
securities, and decreasing it when they sell securities..
The open market operations as first followed by the
Governors Committee was an unimportant part of the credit
policies of the Reserve Banks.

Until 1922 securities were

purchased for their earnings only, however, in 15ay 1922 a
Conference of Governors of the Reserve Banks adopted a “policy
of buying and selling Government obligations in an orderly,
systematic way, not solely with the regard to earnings, but
with regard to the whole credit situation and to the interest
of the Treasury."®
Open market operations and rate policy wore thus made
coordinate instruments of Federal Reserve policy*

This new

policy of the Reserve 3ystem was to exercise Its influence
toward restraint at times when business and speculative acti
vity appeared excessive, and to remove credit restraint at
times of business depression, in the hope that the policy
might aid in avoiding the extremes of business expansion and
contraction and encourage greater business stability.^
In 1926 the committee ordered the buying of securities
on the open market to stimulate business; at this time banks
were increasing their loans because of business expansion.

D. C.:

®Federal Reserve Bulletin. Vol. 8, Ho. 5, (Washington,
United States Government Printing Office, 1923), p. 340.
9Bopp, op. clt., p. 8.

Early in 1928 the committee became alarmed at the expansion
of bank credit and reversed its 1926 policy by having the
Reserve Banks rapidly sell their holdings in the open market.
This had the effect of tightening the money market and forced
the member banks to rediscount their paper at the Reserve Banks
to replenish reserves.

Securities held by the Reserve Banks

declined by approximately 400 million dollars and by August
1928 signs of restraint in lending were in evidence; the up
ward swing of security prices and brokers' loans were temporar
ily checked, therefore, the sales of securities by Reserve
Banks was retarded.
The Reserve Banks increased their security holdings in
January 1929 only slightly, because the committee feared it
would add incentive to the runaway market if they bought secur
ities in large quantities.10

Then, in February, the committee

tried to use moral suasion to halt speculative loans member
banks were making.

However, cheap money for industry continued

to be loaned in conflict with the tight money market held
against speculative loans.

President Herbert Hoover, in an

effort to help the moral suasion policy of the Reserve Banks,
sent Henry M. Robinson, a lawyer-banker and a member of the
Presidents Economic Stabilization Conference, to call person
ally on all the important and Influential bankers in the
country.

He requested them to use self restraint to force

10Harris, pp. cit., Vol. II, pp. 515-520.

IX
contraction in the expanding industrial loan and speculative
security m a r k e t T h e

committee could not force the lower

ing of excess reserves by selling securities in the open market
because it held such a small amount of securities that the
impact of selling them would have been very slight*

It had

sold most of its securities to assist in retarding the expan
sion in the latter part of 1923 and held less than ITT million
dollars of securities on March 2T, 1929*12
Suddenly on October 29, 1929, the market collapsed and
speculative loans were called.

Stock-market credit had reached

the astounding sum of 12 billion dollars, and only the quick
action of the Reserve Banks through their rapid purchase of
securities totaling approximately 300 million dollars permit
ted the member banks to temporarily assume the heavy indebt
edness in the brokers1 loan market.

This easy credit policy

was continued in 1930, its objective being to provide member
banks with sufficient funds to repay their indebtedness to
the Reserve Banks.

The Reserve officials attached importance

to the volume of member bank indebtedness, and the purchase
of securities by the Reserve Banks was intended to relieve
member banks from debt and permit them to adopt a more liberal
lending and Investment policy.

The Reserve officials assumed

-^Kugene Lyons, Herbert Hoover, Our Unknown Bx-Presldent (Carden City, Y. Y .
ftoufcleSay Co•, 1943) , p. 239*
12Harrls, og. cit., pp. 519-522.
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that member banks would not hold reserves in excess of legal
requirements but would repay borrowings from Reserve Banks
and then expand their excesses into profitable earning assets
by expanding their loans.

By the middle of 1933, over 5 bil

lion1dollars had been lent or borrowed by the Reserve Banks
and member bank indebtedness had been eliminated. ^
The Banking Act of 1933 established the direct action
policy of the System and envisioned the exercise of powers
through control over the uses which Reserve Bank credit was
put by member banks directly or indirectly and dealt exclus
ively with operations to which banks were a party.

The Act

prohibited member banks from acting as agents of non-banking
lenders in making security loans to brokers and dealers.
Purchases of securities and a new principle, that of direct
lending, which authorized Reserve Banks to lend directly to
industrial or commercial businesses that could not obtain
financial assistance from the usual sources, was begun in
1934 by the Reserve Banks to accelerate the recovery program.1^
The easy money market policy was continued through the
middle of 1937 and no additional securities were purchased.
In June 1937 the Reserve Banks resumed purchasing securities
on the open market to facilitate a quick recovery from the

•^Bopp,

op*

city. . p p . 12-14.

“^Federal,Reserve Bulletin. Vol. 19, No. 6, (Washing
ton, D. C.: United States1Government Printing Office, 1933),
pp. 385-339*

sudden recession which occurred during the first part of the
year*' ■ By the end of December'1939, the Reserve Banks held .
in their possession approximately 2,500 million dollars of
Government securities, the largest amount in their history*^
Reserve Requirements of Member Banks * The 'Changing,
of reserve requirements against demand and time deposits as
a method of alt©ring actual'and excess-reservesf and thus
affecting member banks* ability to lend, has been used spar
ingly by'the Reserve officials during the Reserve System is
exist©nee* 'the Federal Reserve Act, as originally passed,
provided for the gradual withdrawal of legal reserve money
fro© deposit in the banks of reserve and central reserve
cities*

All such deposited legal reserves were to be with

drawn by November 16, 1917, which was three years after the
date, of the inauguration'of the 'Federal He serve System*-

This

legal reserve of the member banks was to be held in the vaults
of the member banks or In the Federal Reserve Bank,, or in
both, at the option of the member banks.16

However, the

amendment' of June 21, 191? 'required each member bank to main
tain its legal reserve in the form of a deposit at the Federal
Reserve Bank of its district, and it set the-reserve require-

^Federal Reserve Bulletin 1940, op. eit., p. 123.
^Bearings Beforethe Committee on Banking and Currency
United 'States Senatef. 63rd 'Congress, 1st Session,. 1913, Vol.. 1
op. oit** p.- 16.

14
ments against net demand deposits at 13* 10, and 7 per cents
for central reserve city, reserve city, and country banks
respectively, and 3 per cent on time deposits for all member
banks
Reserve requirements were not altered again until Aug
ust 1936, and they were changed only four times from August
1936 to January 1940.

The requirements were at their maximum

ratios from 1917 until 1935 when the Banking Act of that year
permitted the requirements to be doubled to 26, 20, and 14
per cents for central reserve city, reserve city, and country
banks respectively on demand deposits, and 6 per cent for all
member banks on time deposits.

On Hay 1, 1937* the reserve

requirements for all member banks were increased to their max
imum ratios permitted by the Banking Act to adjust to "a changed
reserve situation brought about through the extraordinary inflow
of gold from abroad
The reserves were large and well distributed so that
all but a relatively small number of member banks were in a
•position to meet the increased requirements either by utiliz
ing their excess reserve balances with the Reserve Banks or
by drawing upon their excess balances with correspondent
banks.

^Tfelter 3. Kemmerrer, The ABC of the Federal Reserve
System (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press,’1922),
pp.~36-37.
•^Bopp, op. cit., p. 16.

15
A sudden break in the stook market occurred during
the early part of 1937 and eliminated the gains the stock
market had made from its depression depths of 1933•

The

policy of contraction forced upon banks and security markets
by action of the central banking authority during 1936 and
1937 was considered by a few writers to have been a major
factor in causing the recession during the early part of 1937*
However, according to Alvin H. Hansen, Professor of Political
Economy at Harvard University, raising reserve requirements
and the imposition of stock-market margin requirements were
only minor factors in influencing the break in the security
and commodity markets and the recession that resulted in 1937*
The recovery to begin with, according to Professor Hansen,
was a peculiar one based on a rise in consumption instead of
expansion of investment*

The depression had restrained many

people from buying durable goods, and the improved psychology
following the banking and monetary reforms during 1933» 1934,
and 1935> combined with the need for replacement because of
* <

decreased inventories, released an accumulated backlog of con
sumers1 demand for durable goods*

This demand was financed

largely by an expansion of installment credit*

Thus it was

consumption, not investment, which led the way toward revival
after 1933

This recovery rested almost exclusively on a

19
Alvin H. Hansen, "The Consequences of Reducing Expend
itures,11 Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science. Vol.
17, No. 4, (Mew York: Academy of Political Science, Columbia
University, 1938), pp. 468-470*

16
rising tide of consumption, "moved forward under the stimulus
of an expanding consumer demand fed by (a) consumer©1 Installmont credit supporting purchases of automobiles and other
durable consumers1 goods, and (b) governmental expenditures#"20
Thooa two stimuli ceased* first* when the Government
stopped pumping funds into tho oconosy, and second* when tho ,
consumer durable market financed by installment credit became
saturated#

The result was that consumption tapered off* there

fore, new investment and expanding investments were no longor
urgent and business refused to make any committments beyond
its immediate requirements because of tho fear of overexpansion#21

.

This chain of deflationary offeots was reflected in

tho security and commodity markets by the break that occurred
in the early port of 1937*
The Federal Reserve System assisted in the program to.
halt the recession by purchasing securities in the open mar-.
ket, lowering margin requirements on stock-market cradit, and
reducing reserve requirementa to 22|, 1?^* and 12 por cents
on demand deposita and 5 per cont on time deposits*

Tho re
pp
quirementa remained at these percentagoa through 1939*

^ A l v i n H. Hanson* "What Causes a Business Downturn,"
The How Republic, Vol* 96, Ho* 384, February 2, 1938, p. 384*
21hoe* Sii*r P* 384.
2gFederal Hoserve Bulletin. Vol* 25» Ho* 2, (Washington, D# C.s United States Government Printing Office, 19381,
P # 120«

.
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Stock-Market Margin Regulrements*

Discount rate con

trol, changing reserve requirements, and open market operations
are general Instruments of national credit policy, and are
distinguished from selective Instruments, such as regulation
of speculative credit and control of consumer credit, by the
fact that their primary and principal impact is on the total
amount of credit that is put to use in the economy, while the
selective instruments * impact is on the amount that is put to
use in a particular sector of the economy*2**
Legislative concern respecting stock-market credit was
registered in 1913 by the provisions of the original Federal
Reserve Act which declared notes drawn for the purpose of
trading in stocks to be ineligible for discount.

Direct con

trol of speculative credit was not authorized until the
Security Exchange Act of 1934 gave the Federal Reserve Board
a mandate to issue margin-requirement regulations "for the
purpose of preventing the excessive use of credit for the
purchase or carrying of securities/'2^

The authorization

was strengthened by making these regulations applicable, not
only to all banks, both member and nonmember, but also and

2^Carl E* Parry, "Selective Instruments of National
Credit Policy,” Federal Reserve Pollcy (Baltimore, Md.; Waverly Press, 1947), p * 65*
pA
Judicial Decisions of the Security Exchange Act of
1934. "Margin Requirements,” SeotioiTTT&T/ (Washington, D.C.:
United States (k>vemment Printing Office, 1941)., p. LXXII.

IS
primarily ip extensions of credit by credit-grantors oilier

tban. barks# namely, by brokers and dealers in securities*
The margin requirements on "the long, side" were set
at 26 per. cent effective October 1, 1 9 3 ^ in April 1935*
margin requiremente were raised to 55 per cent and the ■expan
sion of. stock-market credit, which was serious during, the’late

1920*8* was held within officially determined bounds during
the unsettled period in 1936*-37*

To help-relieve the reces

sion In the latter half of 1937* requirements were lowered to
40 per cent on "the long side*1 on November 1* 1937 • Margin

requirements in effect at the end of 1939 were 40 per cent
on "the' long side” and 50 per cent on "the short side" for
©to ok-msrket credit *

Oold Policy 1913-1939*- A problem not discussed under,
the general or selective instruments of the Federal Reserve
System but which influences, the expansion and contraction of
Reserve Bank credit, concerns gold exports and imports-*

The

export and Import of gold has. caused a knotty problem to the
Reserve System*

During World far 1 gold imports expanded

causing" Increases in member bank reserves, thus contributing

^Margin requirements on the "short side” were'not
set until November 1, 1957# and at that time they were set
at SO per cent*
^Federal Reserve Bulletin 1940#. .pp. cli*> p* 550* '

to inflation.

An export balance of trade which causes gold

to flow into the United States creates this chain of effects:
Deposit liabilities of member banks Increase;
member bank reserves are Increased by the amount
of the gold imported; and hence the deposit lia
bility of the Reserve Banks are increased by this
amount; and finally, the reserves of the Reserve
Banks rise. When gold leaves this country the
effects are just the opposite.2?
After the end of World War I the reverse procedure
occurred and gold flowed from the United States as the result
of an export balance of trade caused by the loss of numerous
foreign war markets.
Inflow of, gold.

In 1921 and 1922 there was a large net

However, In. 1922 and 1923 the sale of secur

ities by the Reserve Banks offset part of the influx of gold
and the expansion of the economy was not large.

From 1924

through 1927 the Board reduced rates and stimulated invest
ment In foreign securities, and gold was drawn from this
country.

Monetary reconstruction in Europe during this period

offered an opportunity to effect a redistribution of the gold
supplies of the world*

In 1929 European central banks sold

their investments in New *£ork In order to protect their gold
supplies, and the United States exported large quantities of
gold which helped Increase the intensity of the deflation of
the American economy.

^Tarahla. op. cit., p* 316.

In 1933 th© Gold He serve Act (1) restricted the move
ment of gold to a Treasury function* (2) reduced the gold
content of the dollar from 25*8 to 1 5 ^ grains of g o l d ^ fine,
and (3) raised the price of gold from $20*67 to $35*00 an
ounce.

This action was Immediately followed by a rapid in*

crease In the importation of gold.2^

At the beginning of

193^, excess reserves of member banks were approximately 765
million dollars.

With the increased flow of gold into the

United States during the following three years, member bank
deposits Increased, and their excess reserves Increased to
a total of approximately 3 billion dollars at the end of
1936.
The Board of Governors on August 15, 1936 increased
legal reserve requirements 50 per cent, and thus reduced
excess reserves of member banks from approximately 3*3 to
1.8 billion dollars.

However, the flow of gold imports con

tinued during the latter half of 1936 and the Treasury Dep
artment undertook another measure designed to lessen the
degree of credit expansion, which would have resulted from
these huge gold imports.

The measure adopted by the Treas

ury on December 21, 1936 to accomplish this objective was

Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and Cur
rency. United States Senate, 73rd Congress, 1st Session,
1933, (Washington, D. C'.:, United States Government Printing
Office, 1933), P* 5*
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the gold sterilization program*
The gold sterilization policy was succinctly described
by Professor Harold A. Heed as follows:
"When gold was being imported the Treasury
would sell short-term bills and.use the proceeds
to purchase the gold. In this way the Treasury
would obtain the dollars with which to buy gold
from the money market itself. The gold thus
obtained by the Treasury became the new "inact
ive" gold account (inactive in the sense that
certificates were not issued' against it and de
posited in the reserve bank) and grew to more
than §1,400,000,000 by the middle of September,
1937, at^which time a portion of it was dfciK&erllized.”29
The sharp business recession which developed in the
latter half of 1937 caused gold to be exported from the United
States and the excess reserves of member banks decreased to
approximately 700 million dollars.

The Treasury to stimulate

recovery released approximately 300 million dollars of its
"inactive" gold accumulated in the-course of operation of its
sterilization policy, therefore, the excess reserves of mem
ber banks rose to approximately 1 billion dollars.

After Feb

ruary 1938, the United States returned to an export balance
of trade, and gold flowed back into the country.

The Treasury

announced that "it would henceforth add newly acquired gold

29

Harold A. Reed revision of Chapter XXX "Recent Devel
opments" of a book by Louis A. Rufener, Money and Banking in
the United States (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 193o),
p. 777*

to its “Inactive* account only to the amount of 100 million
dollars,'per- quarter'**

Oold imports•in-oxeess of this amount

were therefore permitted to influence member hank reserves *
■In April 1933* the treasury.^fendoned its steriliba
tion policy altogether* and abolished its "inactive" gold
account by depositing gold certificates with the Reserve Banks*
Sold imports continued to pour into the United States during
1938* and 1939 and largely as a result of these gold imports*
bank excess reserves rose to nearly 5*206 million dollars at
the end of 1939*^

Or December 31* 1939V the total gold

stock in the United states amounted to approximately, if *644
million, dollars *21.-.

II EXPANSION OF THE AMERICAN ECONO® 1940-1945
■the outbreak of the war In Europe in September 1959
promised complete recovery from the depression of the 1930,e.
However, it also presented the problem of preventing a gen
eral inflation of the American economy.

The pressures of

monetary and commodity-prlce inflation began when the national
defense program of the United States was financed by creating

^Rollin' d* Thomas*. Our Modern Banking and Monetary
System {New York: Frentioe-Hall'Inc..* 'lmW> pT 331*"
'

Reserve Bulletin 1940, op. cit*« p. 130*
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currency and bank deposits, and the conversion of American
industries to the manufacture of war materials caused a short
age of available civilian goods.

The primary fiscal objectives

to support the country’s defense policy were (1) to maintain
relative stability in the Government security market, thereby
assuring to the Treasury availability at low rates of interest
whatever funds it needed, and (2) to restrict the creation
of purchasing power to the minimum consistent with the achieve
ment of the first objective.^2
Stability In the Government Security Market«

The Fed

eral Reserve System used its influence to help prevent a
disorderly securities market from developing as a result of
the European war by purchasing, late in 1940, approximately
470 million dollars of Government securities from timid
holders and announced that f,all Federal Reserve Banks stood
ready to make advances on Government securities at par and
at the discount rate."-^

This policy of the Federal Reserve

immediately steadied the market for Government securities.
No further credit policy action with regard to the System’s
general instruments was taken until the fall of 1941 when
reserve requirements were raised to their maximum ratios per
mitted by statute as a check on inflationary pressures

3%oppi 0£. clt.. p. 18.
•^Federal Reserve Bulletin 1940, o p . cit., p. 1178.

generated by the national defense program.
After war was declared on December -8* 1941 I it became
apparent that the System would have to assure that an ample
supply of funds would be available at all times for financing
the war effort, to assist the treasury Department in keeping
the cost of war finance down# and help '"remove .the incentive
that might exist for delaying purchase of Government securi
ties in expectation of a higher yield*"54

initially, this

involved downward adjustments of discount rates to the low
level of 3j of 1 per cent and reduction in reserve requirements
for banks in central money markets to 20 per cent,
done on October 1, 1942*

fhia was

hater, it entailed open market oper

ations in such volume as to provide banks with ample funds
for meeting unusual expansion of the public*s demands for
currency and with adequate reserves for absorbing such Govern
ment securities as were necessary to issue but were not sold
to non-bank investors.

As a further phase of all-out assist

banco in war finance and to assure that the cost to the
Treasury of its expanding war debt would be kept down, the
System adopted stabilisation of the prevailing pattern of
Interest rates as' a primary objective of money market policy.
Between April and September 1942 the Federal Reserve
announced its readiness to purchase unlimited amounts of

Treasury Bills at 3 per oent, Treasury Certificates of In8
debtedness at J per cent, Treasury Notes at li per cent, 8 to
10 year Bonds at 2 per cent, and the longest-term Bonds issued
at 2^ per cent.^

The pegging of the rates on Ooverrunent

issues caused a number of situations to develop which were
not anticipated by the Board or the Treasury Department*

The

bankers and investors discovered their deposits and funds
increasing, therefore they sold their short-term issues and
invested in longer maturing issues of Government securities
with a higher yield, and thus forced the Reserve Banks to
become heavy purchasers of short-term Government securities
offered on the market*

The theory behind this movement was

that the Government securities of all Issues were .liquid*
therefore even short-term funds could be invested in long
term Government -securities to act as secondary and Investment
reserves, thus producing a higher yield.

Another inflationary

pressure resulted because the System lost its control over the’
volume of currency in circulation when it was forced to create
new money to purchase Government securities to support the
market.
Restricting the Creation of Burchasing Bower. To
restrict the creation of purchasing power, which was the second

D.G.:

^Federal Reserve Bulletin; Vol. 29, No. 7, (Washington,
United States Government Printing Office, 1943), p* 590*
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primary fiscal objective of this country*s national defense
anti-inflationary program, the Federal Government decreased
the purchasing power of individuals and corporations and re
duced their deposits at the banks, by drawing off their funds
through the Defense Savings Loan drives, the first of which
was launched on May 1, 1 9 4 1 . ^

There were six subsequent

drives during the war to withdraw excess purchasing power.
The purpose of these drives was to sell Government bonds to
private corporations and individuals, with the banks being
encouraged to buy the residual amounts of bonds not purchased
by others.

The banks had to be included in the drives to

Insure their success if the public failed to subscribe to the
amount of bonds issued.

The purchase of bonds by the banks

caused a greater Increase in deposit expansion and exerted
more pressures on the expanding economy than those purchased
by the public, because the purchase of bonds by banks converts
Government debt into new bank deposits which circulate like
money.

The Government’s deposits are increased, but the

deposits of individuals are not correspondingly decreased, as
they would be if the public bought the bonds and paid for
them from current income and accumulated savings.^

^Federal Reserve Bulletin# Vol. 27# No. 6, (Washington,
D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 609*
^Kemmerrer, ABC of Inflation, op. clt.. p. 16.

The purpose of the drives was to reduce purchasing
power and bank deposits, not expand them.

This program

adopted during the early defense period of permitting banks
to virtually underwrite the loan drives resulted in a serious
obstacle to the government when the problem, during the latter
part of the war, became that of discouraging unnecessary bank
acquisition of Government savings bonds to retard bank credit
from expanding to larger proportions.

The sale of savings

bonds to individuals and corporations was to have the addition
al purpose of preventing the government from Inflating the
economy by creating money for war financing, and thus by fin
ancing the war from current Income additional funds would not
have to be created.
To further reduce purchasing power, personal income
and corporated income tax rates were increased during the
war, and an excess profits tax on corporations was passed by
Congress.
The expansion of consumer credit during 1940 and early
1941 added further to consumer purchasing power, therefore,
on August 21, 1941, the President issued Executive Order 8843,
under the emergency powers granted to him by Congress.

The'

order authorized and directed the Board of Governors to
exercise control over consumer credit for the duration of
the emergency.

This order gave rise to the second selective
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instrument of the Reserve System to control credit.38

The

Board of Governors issued Regulation W effective September 1,
1941, which limited the terms on which consumer credit was
extended, and thereby restricted the demand for its use.

Its

purposes were, first, to restrain demand for consumer durables
during the emergency and thus to reduce Inflationary pres
sures on available supplies of these goods; and second, to
restrict the overall growth of consumer credit and of consumer
buying power during this period and thereby moderate inflation
ary pressures in general.^9
Bank, broker, and dealer security loans, which had
caused the security market to reach tremendous proportions in
1929, were held in check by Regulations T and U of the Board
of Governors during the first part of the defense period.

The

regulations in effect at the beginning of 1940 limited the
extension of credit on securities to

per cent on the "long

side" and 50 per cent on the "short side", of their market
value.

Expansion of security credit continued during the war

period and on July 5, 1945, margin requirements for both
"sides" of the market were raised to 75 per cent.40

At the

3®The first selective instrument of credit control was
Regulations T and U, which authorized the Board of Governors
to regulate margin requirements for speculative loans by
brokers, dealers, and banks*
•30

„

Ralph Young, Federal Reserve System and Credit Con
trol," Commercial and Financial Chronicle. Vol. 164, No. 4560,
0 ctober 22, 1946, p . 2080.
^Federal Reserve Bulletin 1946, op. pit., p. 787*
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end of 1945 security loans outstanding were less than 5*5
billion dollars* a diminutive amount compared to the 12 M X - .
lion .outstanding, before, the market. crash -in 1929*
Monetary Expansion During the1War* Monetary expansion
resulted because the■Government financed 'the war largely by
borrowing* and one of the inevitable consequences of this
type of financing was a rapid expansion in the supply of
money and other liquid assets such as Government securities
and bank deposits*
From. December 51, 1959 to December 31* 1945, the cur
rency volume increased from 7,598 million to 28,5X5 million
dollars.

Over the five year period the country rs demand

deposits expanded from 41,473 to 105#9^3 million dollars, time
deposits from 27*748 to 45,473 million dollars, and the total
money supply, including currency, time and demand deposits,
Increased from 78,819 to 180,161 million dollars.^

In addi

tion, gold stocks 'expanded approximately 8 billion dollars
during this five year period and this increased bank reserves .
and encouraged further bank credit expansion*

As a result of

this large, increase- in currency, and bank deposits Sections
11 (e), and 16 of the Federal He serve Act were amended on

^Federal Reserve Bulletin * Vol. 32, Ho. 6, (Washing
ton P. 0 * i United States Government Printing Office, 1946),
p. 623*

30
June 12 f 1945* lowering the gold reserve against Federal
AO
Reserve notes and deposits to 25 per cent*
The Treasury in this period raised a total of 390
billion dollars#

About 40 per. cent, or 156 billion of this

amount came from taxes*

Nearly 234 billion dollars
was obI

tained from borrowing, of which 100 billion came from the
banking system.

The remainder was borrowed from individuals

and businesses.
The war and defense periods brought about this un
precedented expansion of the American economy which resulted
in a spread between actual total revenue collected from all
sources by the Federal Government and the total money expend
ed, thereby exposing the postwar economy to the risks of
serious instability*

Chart I on the following page shows

that the inflationary pressures which existed at the end of
1945 were the result of war finance.

Part 1 of the accompany

ing chart shows the spread between the total 390 billion
dollars of Government expenditures and the 156 billion dollars
of Government tax receipts during the war and defense periods*
This spread represents a total of approximately 234 billion
dollars borrowed by the Treasury Department.

n Act to Amend Sections 11 (c) and 16 of the Fed
eral Reserve Act, as amended, and for Other Purposes,” Public
haw 8 4 . 79th Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, D. C.: United
States Government Printing Office, 1945), p* 1*
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fhe defend and war period increase of 22 billion
dollars in Federal He serve holdings' of Government' •securities*
together with a decline of over 5 billion in'excess, reserves
of member banks ,• largely provided for the increase of appro.x*
im&teiy. 21 billion dollars of currency in circulation.*; fhia
increase is shown in Fart II of the accompanying chart.
From the beginning of 1940 to the end of 1945 commercial
banka, as .shown in Fart XX* .increased their holdings -of Gov
ernment securities by approximately 80 billion dollars.

During

this period the total holdings o f deposits and currency of
*

individuals and businesses increased approximately 90 billion.,
f

dollars.,

•

*

fhe inflationary potential in the expanded money

supply is roughly indicated by the increase in its ratio to
the annual value of the countryfs total production of all
goods and services,, as shown in Fart- Ilf.of. the accompanying
chart.

The ratios of total deposits and currency to gross-

national product attained aWleyel of JB per cent compared with
less than 70 per cent at the end of 1939*
Part IV of the accompanying chart shows that Individ- •
uals, businesses,'and insurance companies, in addition to
having greatly expanded holdings of deposits m & currency,
held over 90 billion dollars of Government securities at the
end of 1945, seven time©, .a© much .as before the .war*

n3avlhgs

bonds and notes, which are more than half .of this total, are
redeemable on. demand and* as long as the ■Federal. Reserve
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Banks stand ready to buy the marketable securities, these
issues also are freely convertible into cash."^

Part IV

also shows the distribution of the holdings of 278,115 mil
lion dollars of Government securities.

The most important

sources of monetary inflation that existed at the end of
1945 were (a) the superabundance of money, and (b) the bankheld Government debt.
The superabundance of currency and bank deposits at
the end of 1945, could be reduced only through contraction
in public debt held by banks or by a shift In such debt from
banks to more permanent investors; it could be further in
creased, on the other hand, by bank credit expansion.

Fur

thermore, with the level of commercial bank holdings of market
able Government securities $t 82.8 billion dollars, and the
total bank holdings of marketable and nonmarketable Government
securities at 90.8 billion at the end of 1945, it was difficult
for the System to exercise effective control over the total
volume of bank credit as long as these marketable holdings
could be readily sold to the Reserve Banks*

The additional

bank reserves that could be generated at the initiative of
banks and others could have been the basis for an expansion
in bank credit and deposits of from six to ten times the newly
created reserves.

4*5
^Thomas and Young, op. cit., pp. 90-97*

CHAPTER i n
OTLATIOH ADD GO VERMES f BQLICY 1946-1940
In chapter II the evolution of Federal Reserve credit
control policies and the expansion of the American economy
during World War II were discussed*

fhe present chapter will

review the anti-inflationary measures undertaken by the Fed
eral Government, specifically the Federal Reserve System,
during the transition period 1946 through 1948*

However,

to review the Federal Reserve System’s and the Federal Gov
ernment’s policies during the postwar period it is necessary
to separate the sources of inflation into (1 ) monetary, and
(2) commodity-price*
I* P O S W A K MOWRPARY IIF1API0H.
In view of the monetary heritage of war finance, the
Federal Reserve System in 1946 was confronted with the re
sponsibility of attempting to re-establish the System's
primary function, which was regulation of batik credit expan
sion*

However, at the same time the System had to be able

to fulfill Its new responsibilities of assuring reasonable
stability in the prices of the large volume of Government
securities outstanding, and assisting the treasury in keeping
the interest cost of the public debt as low as possible*
Limits upon the ability of banks and others to convert Govern
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ment securities into additional bank reserves were needed
during the postwar period, and these limits had to be im
posed without bringing about widely fluctuating interest
rates.
Interest Hatea and Debt Monetization. This assurance
of stability renders long-term securities more attractive to
bank investors and causes debt monetization.

Debt monetiza

tion results when the differential between short- and long
term interest rates induces the holders of short-term securi
ties to sell them and purchase longer-term, higher-rate issues.
Furthermore, the Federal Reserve System, in order to maintain
a stable market,-was pledged to purchase the short-term secur
ities offered by these holders and thereby create additional
bank reserves.

It contributed to further debt monetization,

and a further decline in long-term interest rates.
The Board of Governors in 1946 reported that:
"Such continued uncontrolled monetization of
the debt and the subsequent decline In interest
rates would accentuate inflationary forces in
all capital assets. Constant downward pressure
on Interest rates arising not from the accumula
tion of savings but from the; creation of unneces
sary bank credit Is not desirable under inflation
ary conditions. Excessivev'competltIon for and
the consequent bidding up of market prices of
outstanding longer-term Government securities
makes for private speculative profits and not for
a saving to the Government. Continued declines
In the rate structure bear most adversely upon the
many millions of the country’s savers, upon insur
ance companies, savings banks, endowments, trust
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funds, and pensions.
"Instead of a further monetisation of the
debt by the commercial banking system, public
policy at this time would be well served if the
banks were to sell some of their long-term hold
ings to nonbank investors and if bank holdings
of the debt were more concentrated in short
term Governments which bear low rates of intereat."1
If the Board of Governors had permitted substantial
variations in the interest rates of Government obligations It
would have complicated the Treasury’s task of refunding its
large maturities.

However, the Board maintained a pattern of

interest rates in which short-term rates were stabilized at
levels considerably below long-term rates, and this was con
ducive to further declines of long-term interest rates based
on expansion of bank credit.
The ;maintenance of higher levels of short-term interest
/

rates would not have prevented the shifting by banks, corpora
tions, „and others from the vast holdings of Government secur
ities in order to meet private demands for credit, because
these demands were particularly strong and banks were competing
actively for such business during the postwar period.

In

t

other words, If.the spread between short- and long-term inter
est rates had been narrowed, and the shift from short- to

^Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System 1946 (Washington. D. 0.: United
States Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 4-5*
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long-term securities retarded, the higher short-term rates
would not have prevented the sales of Govern'ent securities
to expand private debt.
In 1946 the Treasury department and Federal Reserve
disagreed upon policy concerning monetization of the debt.
The Board of Governors favored higher Interest rates on short
term securities, whereas the Treasury favored low rates to
keep the cost of carrying the debt as low as possible.

The

Board in its Thirty-Second Annual Report in June 1946 stressed
that:
"It is possible further monetization of the
public debt which (sic) nay need to be subjected
to more definite restraint, if monetary policy
is to be effective and, Indeed, if the commercial
banks are not to induce further lowering of the
Interest rate structure.’
At the same time Secretary of the Treasury Vinson re
vealed (1) that the Treasury v/as committed to maintain the
low Interest rates to hold down the cost of servicing the
large debt, (2) that the Federal Reserve System must maintain
a market for Government securities, and (3) low interest rates
must be continued to stimulate production and employment.
The Treasury viewpoint prevailed and in June 1946 the Chairman
of the Board of Governors,

r. Rarriner Rcclos, recommended

that no new measures be passed by Congress until its next ses2

Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Board of Governors
1945, o p . clt., p. 4.
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sion in 1947, and stated that, the same interest rates would
he supported by the Federal Reserve System.^
This policy of Cow Interest rates was continued through
1946 and the first half of 194?*

However, on July 2, 1947,

the Federal Open Market Committee directed the Reserve Banks
to terminate their policy of buying all Government bills
offered on the market at g per cent.

The average rates bid

on weekly bill offerings rose from *376 per cent on June 28,
1947, to *740 per cent on the issue of July 24, 1947*

This

move was made with the consent of the Treasury Department and
was to restore Treasury bills as market Instruments to place
some restraint on monetary expansion.

By the end of December

1947, the rates rose to *950 per cent and on December 31, 1948
reached 1.155 par cent*

The rates on Treasury certificates

were also permitted to* rise to prevent continued debt monetination and the percentages rose from .83 at the end of June
1947 to 1.04 on December 31, 1947, and finally to 1.22 on
December 31, 1948.

The short-term Government security market

was bolstered after June 1947, and severe monetization of the
debt was retarded.
Open Market Operations and Discount Rates *

The general

instruments of credit control - opeh market operations and

^ ’’Bankers Get a Year of Grace,” Business Week, Vol. 887,
Ho. 28, June 22, 1946, pp. 17-18.
^Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 35, No. 2, (Washington,
D. G.: United States Government Printing Office, 1949), p* 162.
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discount rate control - were not used by the Board of Gov
ernors because their use would have resulted in declining
prices of Government securities,and because of the huge
public debt outstanding and Its wide distribution*

The

Board could not counteract inflationary developments with
its general instruments? and at.the same time fulfill its
responsibilities for maintaining an orderly and stable mar
ket for 'Government obligations*

Banks were under some presr

sure during 1946 as a result of the debt-retirement program
of the Treasury»■ which forced the banks to sell short-term
securities to the Reserve Banks.

Refusal of the Reserve

Banks to purchase these,securities would have resulted in an
;
1
increase in short-term money.rates; therefore* the Reserve
System purchased all Government securities offered on the
market and thereby maintained the low cost of carrying the
debt and supported an orderly and stable market * However,
this caused the <general instrument s of credit control to lose
their effectiveness. ■
i

Changes in Reserve Requirements. The control of reserve
requirements was of little value in restricting bank credit
expansion after World War II, because the ratios were at their
maximums.in all areas except central reserve cities*

%homas and young, op . eit., pp . 99-100.

Demand

40
and time deposits increased during 1946 and 1947* and addi
tional member bank reserves were required to be held at the
Federal Reserve Banks*

Finally on August 16* 1948 President

Truman signed the anti-inflationary measure passed-by the
Special Session of Congress which authorized the Board of
Governors to raise reserve requirements to 30* 24* and 18
per cent on demand deposits for central reserve city* reserve
city, and country banks respectively, and to 7-| per cent on
time deposits for all member banks

On September 16* 1948

the Board raised the requirements to 26, 22, and 16 per cent
on demand deposits for central reserve city* reserve city,
and country banks* and to 7^ per cent on time deposits for
all member banks.7

These percentages were in effect for mem

ber banks at the end of 1948*
Selective Controls *

In view of the limitation upon

the use of traditional methods of credit-policy under the
changed situation brought about by the war, the only other
measures available to the Board of Governors to restrain mon
etary expansion during the transition period were the selective
controls* namely* margin requirements on stock-market credit
and the requirements for the extension of consumer credit*

a0 ^"President Signs Credit Bill" New York Times, Vol. 2 C v n
No.
*August 17, 1948, p. 1*
7Federal Reserve Bulletin. Vol. 34* No* 11* (Washington*
0. 0.; United States Government Printing Office* 1948)* p. 1115*
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Margin Requirements.

The Board* to halt the specula

tive use of hank credit and expansion of brokers* and dealers*
loans, raised margin requirements on stock-market credit
effective January 1, 1946 to 100 per cent.

Stock-market

credit amounted to approximately 5,729 million dollars on
December 31, 1945, and the required full cash payment for
listed stocks at least partially caused a decline of approx
imately 3,238 million dollars during 1946.

Credit declined

to a level lower in relation to stock prices than prewar days,
and in recognition of the apparent abatement of stock-market
credit expansion, the requirements were returned to their
1945 level of 75 per cent effective January 17, 1947*®

Credit

continued to decline during 1947 by approximately 640 million
dollars.

However, during 1948 an increase of 255 million

occurred, and the total stock-market credit outstanding at
the end of 1948 was 2,102 million dollars.

The accompanying

table shows the margin requirements in effect and the change
in stock-market credit during the transition period.
TABLE X
STOCK-MARKET CREDIT

Date (End of Month
December 1945
December 1946
December 1947
December 1948

Credit
Percentage
Requirements Outstanding *
§5*729,000
75
100
2,491,000
1 ,850,000
75
.
2
,102,000
75

Change in
Credit
-§3,238,000
641,000
♦
'255,000

Source:"Federal "Reserve Bulletin,' January 1958",^^* 45; and
January 1949, p. 46.
®Federal Reserve Bulletin. Vol. 33, No. 1, (Washington
D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 27•

Consumer Credit Requirements*

The control of consumer

credit was continued during 1946* hut after December 1, the
control of Installment financing of major durables only was
continued undbr Regulation W.

Controls on installment credit

were continued because they were subject to the widest range
of expansion and contraction and contributed to business
i n s t a b i l i t y C o n g r e s s permitted Regulation W to expire on
November 1, 194? and during the next nine months consumer
credit rose approximately 2*4 billion dollars, of which ap
proximately 1.8 billion was installment financing*

This

increase prompted a Special Session of Congress on August 7,
1948 to re-establish temporary installment credit controls
on **hard goods” effective September 16, 1948.^

The remainder

of the year consumer credit increased approximately 1,402
million dollars, of which 618 million was installment credit.
TABLE II
CONSUMER AND INSTALLMENT CREDIT
(millions of dollars)
Date (End of
month)

Consumer
Credit Increase

December
December
December
August
December

6,598
10,101
12,074
14,522
15,924

1945
1946
1947
1948
1948

3,603
1,973
2,448
1,402

Installment
Credit
2,325
3,910
5,758
7,578
8,196

Increase
1,585
1,848
1,820
618

Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1949, p* 3007

9
Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1947, op * cit*, p# 1347*
10

New York Times, August 17, 1948, op. cit., p. 1.
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Postwar Government Debt Management.

This monetary
«

policy followed by the Reserve System had to be closely re
lated to the management of the public debt by the Treasury
Department*

The Federal public debt at the end of 1945 was

approximately 278 billion dollars, and the retirement and
refunding had a great deal of influence on monetary devel
opments*
At the end of 1945 the Treasury had a cash surplus of
approximately 26 billion dollars as a result of the War Loan
drive during October and November of 1945*

During 1946 the

Treasury withdrew approximately 22 billion dollars of War
Loan deposits, but caused no reduction in member bank re
quired reserves, as no reserves were required against these
deposits.

However, the retirement of public debt by drawing

on accumulated Treasury balances caused a sharp decline in
commercial bank holdings of Government securities during 1946,
particularly short-term issues.

The most deflationary method

of UBlng an accumulated Treasury balance is to retire Govern
ment securities held by Reserve Banks.
reserves of member banks.

This decreases the

However, during 1946 the retirement

of securities held by Reserve Banks was offset by Reserve
System purchases of securities in the open market.

Thus little
11
or no pressure was exerted on member bank reserves.
The re
duction of holdings of marketable Government securities during
1946 is shown in the accompanying table on the following page.
^ Thirty-Third Annual Report of the Board of .Governors

of the Federal Reserve System 1947 (Washington. D. C.: United
States Printing Office, 1947), p p . *16-17.
’*

-

v -*

•

TABIE III
MARKETABIE POBIIC DEBT OF THE ONITED STATES
(millions of dollars)

types of
Security Holders

Bee. 31
X9kS

Changes
in
Holdings
Boring
19U6

Federal Reserve Banks
Commercial Banks
Mutual Savings Banks
Insurance Companies
Others

2!*,262
82,830
10,1*91
23,183
51,01*6

- 912
-15,868
/ 1,030
/ 1,163
- 6,869

TOTALS

198,820

-22,163

Dec. 31
191*6
23,350
66,692
11,521
2!*,31*6
i*lt,177

Changes
in
Holdings
During
191*7
- 791
- 5,592
/
31
- 1,1*51
- 2,023

176,658 , -10,867

Dec* 31
191*7

Changes
in
Holdings
During
191*8

Dec, 31
191*8

/ 771*
-6,017
- 675
-3,075
/ 1*83

23,333
55,353
10,877
19,820
1*2,637

-8,291*

157,1*97

22,559
61,370
H,562
22,895
1*2,151*
165,791

Source: Federal Reserve Bulletins, March 191*6, p. 273, and March 19l*9, p. 280

#>•
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The pressure on bank credit expansion was continued
during 1947, and approximately 10*9 billion dollars of mark
etable Government securities was retired*

The largest re

duction occurred in commercial bank holdings of marketable
Government securities and amounted to approximately 5#592
million dollars.

The smallest was the 791 million dollar

reduction of Federal Reserve Bank holdings.
reduction of securities was anti-inflationary

This total
Professor

Louis Shere wrote in December 1946 that:
"'Vhile the retirement of bank-held debt
which reduces bank deposits is generally con
sidered more deflationary than retirement of
of debt held by nonbankl ig public, this super
iority depends on the rate of turnover of
deposits which are extinguished. . . . The
most deflationary method of using Government
surplus is either to accumulato Treasury bal
ances with the Reserve anks or to retire
government securities held by the Reserve Ranks
since either method will decrease the reserves
of member banks. Under present requirements
each dollar reduction in member bank reserves
tends to result ln,a sixfold restriction of
demand’deposits."*^
The funds to retire Govemient debt came from the
Treasury surplus secured because Government receipts exceeded

•**%he increase of 31 million dollars in mutual savings
bank Government security holdings is not considered inflation
ary because the mutual savings banks were permanent investors,
and their holdings would not cause expansion in bank credit*
One of the anti-Inflation suggestions of the Federal Reserve
was to shift Government securities to permanent investors.
13
Louis Shore, "Taxation and Inflation Control," Ameri
can Economic Review. Vol. 38, No* 5, December 1943, p. 853*

expenditures, from the net sa3.es surplus of savings bonds and
14
■notes'j and the cash available from .trust funds*
The pressure on bank credit,expansion was continued
during the\first'half of

1948,

but in April, Congress reduced'

the f ax rates for personal incomes * and receipts were less than
anticipated,

nevertheless, the surplus from the previous year

in addition-to the surplus for 1948, plus the cash available
from trust funds .of the government-, and:the net sales surplus
of savings bonds and notes permitted fh© marketable debt to
be reduced, approximately 8.3 billion dollars*
1948, It totaled 157,49? million dollars.15

On December>31»
Table 4 on Page

49 shows the reduction and -distribution'of the marketable-• /
debt for 1948.
From the monetary standpoint, the superabundance of
money .created by wartime borrowing and the high level of in
come flowing from production' and -employment composed part of
the inflationary potential during the postwar period.

This

monetary inflationary pressure occurred at a time when the
supply of goods and services available for purchase and the
funds existing were far from ••adequate-to meet the demand, on
which was superimposed an unprecedented backlog of demand
accumulated during the war years*-

This- was inflation potential

from the.commodity-prlce standpoint*

-^Federal Beserve .Bulletin,. 1948, op:* cit *, p. 43*
■ 15Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 3 5 , No. 3, (Washington,
D. -8*-: Unit©d3tates Printing Office, 1949), p* 280*
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COJKQDITY-PRICiS INFLATION
This commodlty-price inflation potential at the be
ginning of 1946 was held under control by the government
through direct measures, such as price regulation, rationing,
and subsidy payments.
a necessity.

Stabilization as a wartime measure was

However, with the end of the war there was

opposition to restrictive measures of wage controls and scarce
material allocation, and the stabilization program was modi
fied in August 1945*
largely abandoned.

In October and November 1946 it was
As a result of shortages of goods and of

drastic and irregular alterations in the stabilization program,
prices increased sharply in 1946.

"The greatest Increases

occurred in the summer of 1946 during the lapse of price con
trols and late in autumn when controls were largely abandoned,
but in the early part of 1947 there were were further general
price

i n c r e a s e s .

However, prices leveled off during the

second quarter of 1947, but once again they began their steady
riso after the middle of 1947» attributed to the granting of
the second round of wage increases.

Prices continued to rise

during 1948, and the peak was reached in August.

A downward

trend has occurred since that time.
The Economic Report of the President in January 1948

l^Thirty-Third Annual Report of The Board of Governors
1947, o£>. cit., p. 25.

indicated the amount of the rise In wholesale and retail
prices 'during 1946 and the early part of 194? when it stated:
l,fhe abolition of OPA raised the question
how the economy would adjust itself to freedom
from:price control#'' the •answer was--soon read,
in the sharp rise In‘wholesale prices-between
June and December 1946. This was an annual''
rate of almost 50 per cent, one of the steepest
rises -ever recorded* Consumers1 prices rose at
an annual rate_of over 30 per cent during the
s

a

m

e

p e r i o d * '

^

•

the peak of the price level was reached in august 1948
when retail prices averaged 96*3 per cent higher than'’in
1935-39, and wholesale prices 69*5 per cent higher*3*^
Table 4 on the following page clearly shows the changes
in the Consumers'* Price index-and Wholesale Price index of
the Department of labor Statistics, and the Retail Price
Index of the Department of Commerce.

^Economic Report of the President ianuary 1948 (Wash
ington, bT c. :' United' states Government Printing Off i ee, 1948),
p. 34.
^ Survey of Current Business* VOX * 29 , $ 0 # 2 , (Washing-*'
ton, B. cTnSatea States Government Printing Office, 1949) ,
pp* $4*5* '•

TABIE I?

PRICE BJBEXES FOR POSTWAR PERIOD
DECEMBER 191*5-191*8
(averages for month)

Indexes

191*5
December.'

June

191*6.
Dec.'

-

191*7
June., . Dec.

June

191*8 :
Dec.

.

0. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Consumers' Prices (19351939 « 100)

129.9

133.3

167.0

171*.5

171.1*

Wholesale Prises (1926 « 100)

107.1

112.9 . 11*0.9 . 11*8.0 ,163.2

169.5

162.2

0. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Retail Prices (1935-1939 m 100)

11*3.1

11*7.7 , 172.7

196.3

>92.5

Source5 Survey of Current Business, February 191*?, pp.
February 19h9, pp* S-U-5*

153.3

157.1

178.7.

188.1*

December 19k7» pp*

and

*o

CHAPTER IV
THE AKTI-IKFLATIOMR^ POLICIES OF THE. BOARD OF GOVERNORS
AND THE HARVARD ECONOMISTS
This chapter will bo devoted to an analysis of the
ant 1-1nflationary proposals In 1946 of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System„ and Professors Sumner Sllchter
and Alvin Hansen of Harvard University*
I. BOARD OF GOVERNORS AHTI-IRFLATIOD PROGRAM
As a result of the heritage of war finance 9 the Federal
Reserve System was greatly restricted In its capacity to per
form the function for which it was established» namely„ to
oxerclso an effective control over the volume of bank credit
and money supply.

Therefore9 the primary postwar problem

was to re-establish th© System's capacity to influence credit
and monetary conditions in th© Interest of stable economic
development
The Board of Governors in their Thirty-Second Annual
Report to Congress in 1946 stated that "in retrospect It is
evident that more vigorous policies should have been adopted
in order to rale© more of the cost of the war through taxa-

^Thomas and Young, £ 2 * cit*. p. 90.
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tlon and to restrict bank purchases of Government securities."2
Banks were relied upon to a considerable extent to finance
the war because purchases by banks were needed to help main
tain an active security market and to facilitate the general
sale of new Government security issues during the war*
In this connection, it may be interesting to refer to
the conclusions reached by Professor ’71111am J. Fellner, of
the Department of Economics of the University of California,
in his study, Postscript on Tfar Inflation, published in 1947*
Mr. Fellner concluded:
"That a linear (that is to say, proportional)
income tax of about 10 per cent, applied to all
income without exemption, superimposed upon the
income tax structure that prevailed, would pre
sumably have prevented the formation of any
inflation potential* Given such a tax, and given
the direct controls necessitated by specific
shortages, it would not even have been necessary
to use war bond "drives” as a further means of
reducing the demand for goods* However, it
would of course have been necessary to prevent
such wage increases as might start an inflation
ary potential**-^
Mr. Fellner also concluded that:
"There is nothing in the reasoning that could
not be made to fit tax schemes of a different
sort.
"A proportionate Income tax with no exemption

2Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Board of Governors,
o p * cit*, p . 11.
William J* Fellner, "Postscripts on V7ar Inflation,”
Amorloan Economic Review. Vol* 37# Mo. 1, 1947# P* 67*
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possesses distinctly objectionable features,
but they all are shared by Inflation, and
inflation possesses additional objectionable
properties. From the point of view from which
proportionate income tax is bad, that is, from
the point of view of social equity, and the
so-called ability to pay, a rise in the cost
of living is certainly no better. * . . It is,
however, impossible to make an equally clearcut statement on whether it would have been
"good” or "bad” to substitute proportionate
(linear) taxes for part of the progressive
taxes in existence, (that is to say to make
the existing tax structure less progressive)
or whether It would have been ’’good or ’’bad”
to supplement the existing taxes with further
progressive rates,
(that is to say, to increase
the progressiveness of the tax structure) '***
Mr. Fellner deduced that the inflation potential would
have been eliminated by the 10 per cent proportionate tax
superimposed upon the tax structure in existence during the
war, thus avoiding the postwar rise in the price level of
consumer goods and the general inflation of the economy.
War finance restricted the Federal Reserve System in
its use of traditional methods of credit control to prevent
excessive expansion of bank credit.

The Reserve System had

to assure reasonable stability in the prices of the large
volume of Government securities outstanding and assist the
Treasury in keeping the coat of the debt as low as possible.
In -view of this latter limitation to which interest rate

^American Economic Review, Ibid., pp. 87-89-
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policy was subjected, a flexible rate should have been fol
lowed by the Board of Governors at the beginning of 1946 to
permit some variation In the spread between* and levels of,
short- and long-term interest rates.

This would have helped

re-establish some control over credit expansion, as well as
preventing the downward movement of long-term interest rates
growing out of monetization of the public debt.
However, it would not have been possible to control
bank credit expansion and debt monetization through the use
of general or selective Federal Reserve instruments Of credit
control.

Therefore, to assure effective discharge of the

Sybtem’s basic long-run responsibilities, additional instruraents of general credit regulation would have been needed*
These instruments would have had to re-establish the System’s
functions along traditional central banking lines*
Proposals for Credit Control.

The Board of Governors

in their Thirty-Second Annual Report outlined three basic
proposals for consideration by CongressJ
(1) A bond limitation plan.
(2) A secondary reserve plan.
(3) A primary reserve plan.
The Bond Limitation Plan* .This plan would have limited
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the amount of "long-term marketable securities, both public
and private, that any commercial bank could hold against
c
demand deposits.'
In other words, this plan would merely
have extended the principal pursued during the war, of re
stricting investment of demand deposit funds in long-term
assets.

The plan was an indirect method designed to halt

the shifting of commercial bank.holdings from short- to long
term Government securities*

Howevex; it would not have

guaranteed that the banks would have bought short-term Gov
ernment securities; it probably would have encouraged bank
lending to secure higher profits.

The reduction of the

amounts of long-term Government securities that banks would
have been permitted to hold would have caused interest rates
on long-term securities to drop and complicate the Treasury’s
task of refunding its long-term issues.

A decline in long

term rates caused by pressure of credit expansion, rather than
by a surplus of current savings over the capital demands of
business, would have had additional inflationary influence in
the security markets and would have been disruptive to finan
cial processes*6
The bond limitation plan would not have stimulated
shifts from long- to short-term Government securities; it

^Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Board of Governors,
op * cit.. pp. 7-B.
Thomas and Young, op. cit;, p. 102.

would have created th© problem of finding other investors
for long-term securities.

It would have had littie effect

on restraining bank lending, and probably would have encour
aged banks to lend to secure higher yields onthelr invest
ments rather than restrain lending, which was the proper
scope of the plan*

This plan offered no guarantee that banks

would have shifted their holdings to short-term Government
securities in place of long-term securities.

Therefore* the

plan is not considered by the writer to be a good anti-infla
tionary measure * and will not be included in the program to
be discussed later in the thesis.
The Secondary Reserve Plan.

This plan would have

established a required reserve, in addition to the member
banks1 balances with the Reserve Banks, which would have been
held in Treasury bills or certificates equal to a specified
percentage of net demand deposits of all commercial banks.
The Board, to facilitate transition to the secondary reserve
plan, would have permitted the banks to hold additional re
serve balances with the Reserve Banks or vault cash in lieu
of Treasury bills or certificates *

The reason given by the

Board for the inclusion of this principle in the proposal was
that it would have been necessary for the Treasury to supply
bills or.certificates to the banks needing them to meet their
secondary reserve requirements against expanding deposits.
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which would have resulted In 11further pressure for bank
credit expansion and deposit growth rather than restraint,
which was the purpose of the plan to provide/’?
The secondary reserve plan would have permitted banks
to retain substantial holdings o f .short-term Government
securities, while limiting their ability to sell them to the
Reserve Banks in order to make other loans and investments;
at the same time, it would have assisted the Treasury to main
tain the low carrying cost of the public debt and to help
stabilize interest yields.

It was necessary to include all

commercial banks under this plan, not just member banks of
the Reserve System, because of the large amount of securities
held by banks outside the System at the beginning of 1946,
and because it \?ould have given nonmeraber banks competitive
advantage over member banks in securing higher-yielding
investments.
The secondary reserve plan is considered to be a more
direct measure to insure the low cost of carrying the debt
and in halting debt monetization than the bond limitation
plan.

Therefore, later in the thesis, the proposal will be

included In the anti-inflationary program suggested by the
writer.

The section of the secondary reserve measure which

permits banks to hold vault cash or excess reserves in lieu

?Thomas and Young, op. olt*. p. 115*
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of Government securities will not be included for reasons
given above#

To counteract the problem of having to supply

Treasury bills or certificates to meet possible expanding
deposits, a special short-term Government security presumably
would be issued and sold to the Federal Reserve Banks, and
the revenue secured from this assumed new issue would be used
to retire longer-term bank-held Government securities as
they reached maturity.

Thus no further bank credit expansion

would occur.
The Primary Reserve Plan.

This plan would have given

the Board of Governors authority to increase member bank
reserve requirements.

The principal effects of this proposal

would have been to (1) shift certain amounts of short-term
lower-yielding Government securities from commercial and
member banks to Federal Reserve Banks, and (2) to reduce the
ratio of multiple credit expansion on the baBls of a given
amount of reserves.

It would have, therefore, reduced the

amount of short-term Government securities available for sale
by the banks to the Reserve Banks and also reduced the degree
of credit expansion that would have been possible on the basis
of any reserves created by such sales.

The Reserve Banks

would have had to be heavy purchasers of short-term securities,
thereby assisting the Treasury to support low interest rates
on the public debt.
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The Board of Governors, In Its Thirty-Second Annual
Report, included an unusual suggestion in the plan to increase
reserve requirements when they reported that, "if this author
ity

is granted, banks should be permitted to count vault cash

as reserves and there should be provision for greater admino
istrative flexibility tin‘
applying changes In requirements*1
Walter £• Spahr, Professor of Economics at Hew York Univer
sity, in July 1946 expressed the criticism of a number of
economists, when he stated;
"Perhaps no harm, or possibly even benefits,
would result if Congress gave the Board authority
to raise reserve requirements of member banks
above those now authorized*
"But why should the Board now wish to enable
member banks to count vault cash as reserves?
After all that has been said and written by
Reserve Boards and monetary authorities in the
past about the virtues of centralized reserves,
what defensible ground can this Board find for
wishing to embark upon a program of decentrali
zation of our reserve structure? If there is
any sound argument to support this program, this
author is unaware of it*
.
"This report of the Board gives this author
the impression that anything that is in vogue
for any length of time and if accepted as sound
is naturally suspect In the eyes of the Board.
If It is ’traditional* it is apparently, and of
necessity bad* . . .
"The absurdity of this suggestion becomes
even greater when it Is recalled that on June 12,
1945, this same Board persuaded Congress to ex-

®Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Board of Governors,
op. cit., p. 8*
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elude from the reserves of the Federal
Reserve Banks all Treasury cash except
gold certificates. In other words, this
Board now proposes that Treasury (and other)
; cash that cannot serve for reserves in the
Reserve Banks should he counted as part of
the reserves of member banks I One of these
proposals is Just as Indefensible as the
other.”9
The Board*s report also contained the provision that,
"to assure effective control, all commercial banks should be
subject to the same reserve requirement.!*10

Professor Spahr

expressed his opinion concerning this provision of the pri
mary reserve plan as being **sheer nonsense•”
it

He wrote that:
!

"Monetary authorities and past Federal
Reserve Boards have pointed out over and over
why commercial banks should be classified and
not subject to the same reserve requirements.
So far as this author knows this is the first
time that any Reserve Board since 1914 has
discovered that such a system, so long studied
and so long approved, is really not sound in
principle. The present Board, in this report
now profounds a new *truth* without providing
any reasons for it beyond saying, that it is
*to assure effective control.* That is, in
the opinion .of this writer sheer nonsense.
The Board of Governors at the time of the submission
of Its Thirty-Second Annual Report in 1946 had appointed a
i

'

Committee of Federal Reserve Bank and Board Economists to

^"Federal Reserve Credit Proposals," Commercial'and
Financial Chronicle, Vol. 164, No. 4506, July 3, 1946, p. 236.
^Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Board of Governors,

22 • d t ., p. 8.
11

Spah r . o p . cit.a p. 236.

study the problem of hanking and credit policy cone^iing
uniform reserve requirements for all member hanks.

However*

the Federal Reserve Bank and Board Economists1 report was
not submitted to the Board .of Governors until April 22, 1948*
almost two .years after1the-Board included the -uniform' reserve
requirement principle in its Annual Report for 1948*

There

fore* In the opinion of this writer* presumably the Board of
Governors should not have announced this principle in 1946
before the study and arsLysis of the Federal Reserve Bank and
Board Economists was completed*
This report of the Committee of Beserve Bank and Board
Economists In 1948 reached Important conclusions as to uniform
reserve requirements*

In this connection* it may be interest

ing to refer to the suggestions which the Committee of Bank
and Board Economists submitted to the Board of Governors in
1948.

The Committee concluded?
“The designations o f ■central reserve and
reserve cities should be eliminated*
"The basic initial reserve requirements
should be prescribed against net demand depos
its as follows;
la) 30 per cent against interbank deposits
whether demand or time.
(b) 20 per cent against other demand depos
its less cash items In process of collection,
(c) 6 per cent against time deposits*
‘’The federal Open Market Committee should be
empowered to increase or decrease these basic
requirements to a maximum of 50 per cent*

"Vault cash should be permitted to b©
Qounted as: part of reserve requirements *
n

ConsId©ration should be given to the
desirability of prescribing uniform reserve
requirements to be observed by ail nonmember
banks in lieu of or in addition to those
presoribed by State law*"3*2
The primary reserve plan will be included with the measures suggested by the.writer to halt or retard Inflation
later in the study. -However*, the uniform reserve requirement
and counting vault cash as reserves will not be Included be
cause the intensive study required to analyze the effects Is
beyond the proper scop© of this study.
.Proposals, for .Additional Controls. The Board of Gov
errors in Its 1945 Annual Report suggested also (1) to continue regulation of consumer credit on a permanent basis ad
an integral part of the SystemVs function of maintaining
sound credit conditions | (3) a retirement program aimed at
bank-held securities and a refunding operation issuing nonmarketable securities and redeemable before maturity only at
a proportionately lower ret urn; and (3) to maintain the same
tax structure in 1946 and 194?."^

12Staff Subcommittee to a Committee of Federal Reserve
Bank and Board Economists,• "gjqgy ’of Cntform Reserve Require
ments for all Member Banks*w {Unpublished report presented to
the Board of (Jov errors of the Federal Reserve Bystem, Washing
ton, X>. C., April* , April 22, 1948) , pp. 3-4.
^Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Board of Governors,
op . cit. p p . ,23-25.
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Consumer Credit Regulation*

Consumer credit In 1946

added to the purchasing power of individuals at a. time when,
the economy was already overburdened with an excessive supply
of money in relation to the available volume of goods and
services.

Regulation of consumer credit would have restrained

excessive demands for credit by limiting the borrowing capacity
of prospective purchasers of goods and services*

Therefore,

Regulation W will be included in the anti-inflationary program
suggested later in this study*
Tax. Refunding and Retirement Program.

The tax program

and refunding and retiring of Government securities, suggested
in the 1945 Annual Report of the Board of Governors would have
had to supplement each other to be effective in combating
postwar inflation.

Federal Government receipts, if they ex

ceeded expenditures, would create Treasury surpluses, and to
retire Government securities from this surplus would act as a
deflationary force upon the economy.

During the postwar per

iod the Federal debt was reduced to a limited extent by applyingftfreasury surpluses to retire maturing securities*

Too

rapid a retirement of maturing-Government securities deflates
the economy too quickly, and would injure the economic struc
ture.

Therefore, it would have been necessary to set up a

systematic reduction of the debt.

The refunding operations

would have had to be directed toward issuance of a non-marketable and nonredeemable securities, with features similar to

the Series G savings bonds which were Issued during the war
and defense periods* except with differences as to eligibil
ity ferpurchase* purchase limits# and maturities,

they

would-have had to be issuedj
. * • to absorb the savings of the public in
the hands of institutional investors not being
Invested in private outlets. The use of this
type of security permits the Treasury to ,pay an
‘ appropriate.rate .for genuine long-term savings
and provides an instrument for protecting the
income of bona fide investors while also pro
tect ing them against capital loss in ease of
liquidation before maturity * At the same time,
this type of security safeguards the Treasury
against paying a high coupon rate on liquid
investments to temporary holders.14
•Certain measures will be suggested by this' writer to
decrease the. purchasing power ef individuals, and assist the
anti-inflationary■program proposed later in this study# and
regulation of consumer credit will be one of those measures.
The program will also involve creation of a Treasury surplus
*

and its use to retire bank>held Government securities*
IX* AKTI-1NFLATX0MEY PEGG E M PROPOSED
BY PROFESSOR SUMER H. SDXCHTER
On April 30, 1946# Professor Sumner Slichter, of Harvard
University, pointed out some of the preventive measures that
. could have been used to relieve the pressures of postwar ihfla•tion*

Professor ■Sliohter did not fear a general price rise

l^fhomas and Young, op. cit -, p* 110*
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was necessarily bad for the economy *

However, he held that

to keep the rise moderate, orderly* and free from speculative
excesses was the essential objective of any antinflationary
plan*

To do this he advocated four principal steps *
(1) Limiting further increase in demand deposits*
(2) Keeping the demand for goods on the part of
the Government to a minimum.
(3) Improving administration of OPA.
(4) Keeping production costs fro® rising rapidly—
or better still reducing them.^5
Limit Further Increase in Demand Deposits.

To limit

the further increase in demand deposits Professor Sliohter
suggested (a) balancing the budget, (b)*paying off part of the
government debt held by the banks, and (c) controlling expan
sion of bank credit.
If a Treasury surplus could be secured during the post
war period, he suggested that the retirement of the part of
the debt held by banks would reduce der.and deposits , thereby
relieving inflationary pressures.

However, if a deficit

occurred as a result of Government expenditures exceeding re
ceipts during the postwar period, this deficit would have had
to be financed to a considerable extent by further expansion
of bank credit, thus increasing Inflationary pressures.

A

deficit, if directly financed out of real savings rather than

15sumner Slichter, nThe Threat of Inflation/1 Commercial
and Financial Chronicle. Vol. 163, No. 4486, May 2, 1946, pp*
2 3 % , 2390-91*

bank loans , would not load to an expansion of bank deposits*
■Therefore, to prevent the Treasury deficit from increasing,
Professor Blichter opposed a reduction of taxes during 1946
and 194?.
Professor Sltchter also stressed that, "bank credit
which finances the accumulation of inventories or which flnan*
ces consumption is just as inflationary as bank credit which
finances government deficit#”

Therefore, he advocated the

regulation of consumer credit because it financed consumption
and was inflationary#’Keep the Demand for Poods on the Part of the Government
to a Minimum # Professor Slichter’s second principal proposal
was that state, local, and national governments should post
pone all public works.which were not urgently needed, so long
as danger or a disorderly rise in prices was acute.

He sug

gested allocation of scarce building materials to prevent
residential building from being hampered by unimportant public
works during the transition period.
Price Regulation. The third step proposed by Profes
sor Slichter involved improving the administration of OPA.
He wrote that:
wBorne businessmen have asked for an immed
iate termination of OPA except in certain fields,
such as rent, this, in my -judgment, would be un-

l6Sl.tehte3?» Ibid., p. 2390.
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wiBe. It would require business to assume
responsibility for preventing a disorderly
rise In prices before business is able to
assume that responsibility.”1?
Professor Sllchter predicted a rapid rise in the general price level of the economy as the outcome of early
termination of price controls*

He suggested that OPA bo

continued during the postwar period but improved specifically
by modifying the conception of the objectives of price con
trol*

He believed that price control during the postwar

period should not keep prices at the 1946 level* but permit
them to rise gradually and orderly, until OPA could be term
inated without causing a rapid rise in prices.

A cost-price

relationship would have to be the aim of price regulation,
and the improved administration of OPA would also have to
aim at a better balance of prices*
Reduce Production Costs *

The final principal pro

posal to retard inflation was considered by Professor
Sllchter to be the most important element in price control.
“Unless,” wrote Professor Sllchter, “labor efficiency can
be.increased fast enough to prevent future wage increases
from forcing price increases, the country will involve it
self in a spiral of wage-prlce advances.

The only real pro

tection against rising wages bringing about higher labor
costs and a spiral of price-wage advances is an Increase in

i7Slichter, Ibid.. p, 2390.

output per man h o u r T h i s

prediction foresaw the outcome

of the wage-prlce spiral that has occurred in the American
economy during the postwar period* r Paring the transition
period from 1946 through 1948, management and labor failed
•to-have ''enough interest in long-range planning of wage-cost-,
price 'relationship .to help prevent a commodIty-price infla
tionary spiral-

labor, in 1946* demanded and received

Increases in wages that permitted the take-home pay of the
postwar shorter work week to equal the high'weekly earnings
of the'.premium-paid wartime period.

At the asm© time, man

agement demanded and secured the elimination of direct controia of prices and' materials because they believed, the
controls were hindering industry in increasing production* •
Wages and prices began spiraling upward in 1946 and
.new wage Increases were granted in 194? based upon the increased

price level'and the cost of living.

As prices rose and in

creased the cost of living, wag©’earners exerted.additional
pressures for further wage Increase’
s and management, increased." .
prices to meet ■the increased wage cost when the increases were
granted# Thus developed the upward wage-price spiral of the
postwar period.
Combination of Measures to Prevent Price Inflation*

Professor Sllchter concluded that a successful program

l8Slichter, S M d >, p. 2391.
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to control prices required a combination of these policies
to prevent a disorderly rise in prices.

He wrote that:

"Government expenditures need to be kept
down, taxes need to be kept up, banks need to
avoid pushing the expansion of consumer credit,
price controls need to bo continued (though on
a more liberal basis), business managers need
to hasten improvements in methods of produc
tion, trade unions need to refrain from pres
sing demands which increase money wages without
increasing real wages, and need to do what they
can to increase output per man h o u r . " 1 ^
The suggestions of Professor Sllchter to combat price
inflation call for direct and selective measures.

However,

he would leave the prevention of bank credit expansion upon
the good sense and foresight of the bankers themselves.

If

price inflation were controlled by direct and selective meas
ures, It is the opinion of this writer that monetary infla
tionary pressures should also be controlled by direct or
selective measures to assist the commodlty-prlce inflation
control.

Monetary and oommodity-price inflation are related

and the controlled reduction of monetary sources of inflation
will supplement commodity-price inflation control.

Therefore,

it is better to be able to direct contraction of monetary
pressures than to leave them to the good sense and foresight
of the bankers.

Professor Sllchter considered the monetary

19Slichter, Ibid.. p. 2391.

anti-‘■Inflationary .program suggested by toe Board: of Governors
in its 1945 Annual Report as too drastic- and he eon.sidored it
possible that it would have' resulted in inflationary' rather
.

■

•»

than'deflationary effects upon, the economy.
tx i.
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AMTi-iBFLAfIOHARU PROGRAM

In June 1946 .Alvin Hansen, professor of Political Econ
omy at Harvard University# stated s.
”to preserve the integrity of our money, seven
policies are necessary:' •(I)'to continue price
control# (2) to rapidly increase the production ,
of houses, consumers* durables, and clothing,
(3) to secure'a balanced adjustment of wages to
man-hour productivity without pushing wage rates
so high as to raise labor cost -and necessitate
a general over-all increase in prices, (4) to
continue high taxation, ( 5 ) -to'continue a program
of saving by the entire population with special
emphasis on the purchase of savings bonds* (6) to
apply treasury funds derived from excess tax rev
enues or sale" of bonds to the public in excess.or
redemptions, to retire Government securities held
by commercial banks, (7) to insure, that commerc
ial banks would not'abuse their- access to Federal
Reserve Bank credit and, thus build up excess re
serves as a basis for unwarranted -monetary ex
pans ion .**•
Professor Hansen *a proposals"to.combat inflation were
similar to Professor SXichtsr-s.

They both favored price con*

trol,' a sensible wage policy ..to prevent a wage-price spiral,
•frifljn

irfc^Ji «■,f in 'll (H,i >WIi, h

20Sllehtei># B i d ., p. 2390*
^■'■Alvin Hansen, "Inflation,” Yale Review. Vol. 35«
Wo. 4, June 1946, p. 710.

continued high taxation, reducing commercial bank holdings of
Government securities, permitting bank credit expansion to bo
voluntarily limited by the bankers themselves, increasing the
sale of savings bonds, and finally, stimulation of residential
;-S>V

building by assisting in allocating scarce materials*
The voluntary measures of Professors Hansen and 511chter
for monetary inflation control are not applicable to the econ
omy in a country like the United States were competition is
keen.

It has been necessary in the past for the Federal Gov

ernment to use direct and selective controls to carry out
policies for the social well-being of the economy.

Therefore,

the writer believes stronger measures than those suggested by
Professors Hansen and Sllchter would have been-necessary to
reduce monetary inflationary pressures during the postwar
period,.

5uch measures are included in the program proposed

in Chapter W.

CHAPTER V
A PROGRAM TO CONTROL POSTWAR INFLATION
The monetary anti-inflationary proposals considered
to be the most effective, In addition to a number of.measures
suggested by the writer, will be examined in the present
chapter from the point of view of their probable effectiveness
in halting or retarding inflation* if they had been adopted
by the Federal Government at the beginning of 1946#
A program designed to combat monetary inflation would
also assist in preventing commodity-price inflation.

However,

in addition to this fiscal anti-inflationary program, direct
measures, such as price regulation, wage stabilization, and
scarce material allocation would have been necessary to com
pletely retard general inflation of the American economy.

In

order to confine the present study to reasonable limits, how
ever, it is restricted largely to a plan to retard inflation
from the monetary angle only.
The purposes of the monetary anti-inflationary plan
proposed in this chapted are (1) to decrease the amount of bankheld Government securities or shift them to less inflationary
holders, (2) to keep the cost of carrying the public debt as
low as possible and at the same time retard debt monetization,
and (3) to reduce or retard the Increase of purchasing power

of individuals and corporations*
The measures considered to be worthy of Inclusion In
the proposed plan to combat postwar Inflation are the follow
ing:
(1) A secondary reserve proposal*
(2) A primary reserve proposal.
(3) A compulsory savings plan for individuals.
(4) An Increase in corporate net income tax rates.
In order to assess the effectiveness of such measures,
an attempt will be made to trace their probable effects In
1946, if they had been adopted at the beginning of the year.
1. SECONDARY RESERVE PLAN
At the beginning of 1946 it did not appear feasible to
permit the interest rates of Government securities to be set
by the demand of the market, because refunding of the short
term Government debt could not have been accomplished except
at higher rates, and this would have Increased the cost of
carrying the debt.

Therefore, to prevent these occurrences

and to help retard debt monetisation it Is assumed that an
Act was passed by Congress at the end of 1945 to permit the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to Impose
a maximum secondary reserve requirement of 50 per cent upon
all commercial banks in the United States.

This would also
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have accomplished the broad purpose of reducing the lending
power of the banks.
It is assumed that the Board of Governors set the
secondary reserve rate at 20 per cent effective January X*
1946.

This plan would have required all commercial banks in

the United States to hold short-term Government securities,
namely, treasury bills or treasury certificates in the amount
of 20 per cent against their demand deposits.
Assumed Effects of the Secondary Reserve Plan in 1946..
Actual net demand deposits of all banks w e r e 105,923 million
dollars as of December 31, 1945*

With the assumed 20 per cent

secondary reserve requirement in effect, a minimum of 21,185
million dollars of short-term Government securities presumably
would have been held by the commercial banks,

the banks at

the end o f ,1945 actually held 20,56? million dollars of treas
ury bills and certificates.

Therefore, only a small amount of

short-term securities would have had to be purchased to meet
;

the proposed secondary reserve requirements.
During 1946 demand deposits decreased approximately
13,478 million dollars and on December 31, 1946 totaled ap
proximately 92,445 million.

Table 5 on the following page

shows the total demand deposits for all commercial banks at
the end of 1945 and 1946, and the amount of Treasury bills or
certificates that they would have been required to hold under
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the suppositious secondary reserve plan.
TABLE V
DEMAND DEPOSITS OF ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS
AND
ASSUMED SECONDARY RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
December 31# 1945 and 1946
December 31
December 31
.-.. 1946 ..
____
1945
$105,923,000

Total Demand Deposits
Assumed Secondary Reserve
Requirements

20$

Total Assumed Secondary
Reserve
(Treasury bills or certificates)$21,185,000

$92,445,000
20$

$18,489,000

ii- -.. :.. --....--...... - ■ . ... ■ '...-.-. ‘.Source: Federal Reserve Bulletins, 1946, p. 892, 1947# p* 870.
The proposed 20 per cent secondary reserve requirement
would have required approximately 18,489 million dollars of
shortrterm Government securities to have been held by commerc
ial banks at the end of 1946.

However, the banks had reduced

their actual holdings of Treasury bills and certificates from
20,567 million dollars at the end of 1945# to 12,408 million
at’the end of 1946, thereby creating a theoretical short-term
Government security deficit of 6,081 million dollars.
million - $12,408 million)

($18,489

The accompanying table on the

following page shows the actual change in all classes of mark
etable Government securities held by commercial banks during
1946.
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TABLE VI
MARKETABLE PUBLIC DEBT HELD BY COMMERCIAL BANKS
December 31* 1945 and 1946
(millions of dollars)
Holdings
Dec. 31

Type of Issue
Treasury
Treasury
Treasury
Treasury
Other*

Bills
Certificates
Not©8
Bonds

TOTALS

...... - 1.955,,....
2,476
18,091
15,701
46,535
82.803

Change in
.Holdings
1946
+
-+

Holdings
Dec. 31
1946 .

1,289
6,870
9,581
1,873
26

1,187
11,221
6,120
48,408
26

-15.841

66.962

* Postal Savings, prewar bonds, and a small amount of Guaran
teed securities.
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1947# P» 890.
Column (2), Table 7 on the following page shows the
shift of 6,081 million dollars of commercial bank securities
that presumably would have occurred under the proposed
secondary reserve plan.

It'is assumed that the banks would

have reduced their holdings of long-term Government securities
rather than decrease their high-yielding loan portfolios, and
the securities would have been supplied by the Federal Reserve
Banks from their short-term security holdings, or from a
special short-term Treasury security issued exclusively for
bank holding, to meet the short-term security deficit.

TA3L8 V II

MARKETABLE PU3LIC DEB? HELD 31 C0CK1RCUL 3A?!K5-19li6
AND
ASSDMSD CHANGES RESULTING FROM T?U6 PROPOSED ANTI-ISFUTICmARX PUN
(million# of dollar#)

Type of Issue
Treasury
Treasury
Treasury
Treasury
Others*

Bills
Certificates
Note#
Bonds

TOTALS

Assumed Shift in Holdings Resulting from . iasmed
Actual
Increased Change* In learned
Secondary Increased
Primary
Total
Holding*
Holding*
Compulsory Corporate
Reserve
Incase
in
191*6
Dec.
31, 191*6
Holdings
Require Reserve
Savings
ment
T)ec.31,19L6
Plan
Tax
(Total)
(1) - (6)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(1)
(2)
(M

-ir

1,167
11,221
6,120
1*8,1*08
26
66,962

t 669
/5.U12
- 51*7
-5,531*

- 230
-1,858

- 31*1*
-2,786

-101*
-850

/
669
i 5,1*12
- 1,225
-11,028

-2,088

-3J130

-951*

- 6,172

1,856
16,633
1*,895
37,380
26
60,790

* Postal Savings* Prewar Bonds* and a small amount of Guaranteed securities.
Source* (1) federal Reserve Bulletin, 191*7, V* 390.
(2) Assumed shift in holdings described on pa^es 7h and ?£•
(3) Table 10, Column (6), Page 82. The increase in primary reserve requirement applies only
to member banks of the Federal Reserve System.
(!*} Table U , Column (3), Page 85*
(5) Table 11, Column (*), Page 85.
(6) Totals of Colisans (2), (3), (!*), and (5)*
(f) Colxnn (6) subtracted fro® Column (l).

To meet the secondary reserve deficiency of 6,081
million, dollars, It Is assumed that the commercial hanks would
•have purchased m additional 66 9 million dollars in Treasury
hills and '§*412 million in freasury certificates*

To obtain

funds.lor these, purchases, it is assumed that they';would have
sold mx- additional’§4? million dollars in Treasury notes and
5,554 million in'Treasury bonded ■The composition of the com
mercial hanks'1' marketable Government security holdings, as a
result of the assumed shift from long- to short-term securities
is shown in Table $ on the following' page.

{$1*856 million in

Treasury'Mil# t $16*635 million In'Treasury:certificates ■*•
required, secondary reserves' of -$18*489-*)

% h e •theoretical shift from long* to 'short-term, Govern*
ment securities by the commercial hanks was.assumed to have
been divided as follows s’"
(1) ‘The decrease In Treasury notes and bonds was divided
according' to the approximate actual' ratios of'notes to bonds
held.by'the :commercial ,Mnks. at the .-end of 1946.* Thus* II per
cent of the ■total'decrease of 6 ,081 million dollars of long% $ m securities■were notes and 89 per cent:were bonds*
(2) The increase.'in Treasury bills and'certificates was
divided .according to the- approximate actual ratios of bills
to certificates; held by commercial banks, at the end.of ,1946*
Thus, 9 per cent of. the total increase of 6,081 million dollars
of •short-term securities were M i l s and, 91 per cent were eer->
tifi cates •
It is believed by the writer that this is a |ustiflable
method of assuming the increase- e-r- decrease in Government
securities*, and would, therefore, -maintain the ratio between
Treasury notes and bonds, and Treasury M i l s and certificates*
which existed at the end of 1946*
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TABLE VIII
ASSUMED MARKETABLE DEBT HELD BY COMMERCIAL BANKS 1946
(millions of dollars)

Treasury
Treasury
Treasury
Treasury
Other*

Bills
Certificates
Notes
Bonds

1,856
16,633
5,573
42*874
.26

66.962
TOTALS
* Postal Savings, prewar bonds, and a small amount of .
Guaranteed securities.
Presumably there would have been no change In the total
amount of Government securities held by commercial banks, but
only a shift from long- to short-term securities to meet the
requirements of the proposed secondary.reserve plan.

An im

portant effect of the plan would have been the retarding of
debt monetization, because the commercial banks would have
had to hold 6,081 million dollars more short-term Government
securities at the end of 1946*

Presumably they would have

reduced correspondingly their long-term Government security
holdings.
II. INCREASED PRIMARY RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
The second anti-inflationary proposal involves the
amendment of the Federal Reserve Act at the end of 1945 to
permit the Board of Governors to raise reserve requirements

-
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to double the maximum ratios permitted by the Banking Act of
1935*

The purpose would be twofold:

(1) to act as a psycho

logical threat against the member banks.

In other words, the

* Board would be able to use its increased power over bank re
serves as a "big stick” against member banks — * threatening
the banks with a raise in requirements if excessive credit
expansion occurred; and (2) to empower the Board to actually
raise reserve requirements, thereby causing member banks to
restrict lending.
To raise reserve requirements of member banks would
affect the lending power of the banking system, because during
1946 member banks of the Reserve System controlled over 83
per cent of the total demand deposits of the commercial bank
ing system, and over 55 per cent of the total time deposits
of the entire banking system.

Columns (1) and (3) of Table 9

on the following.page show that the average amount of demand
deposits was 77,333 million dollars and time deposits 27,059
million in member banks of the* Federal Reserve System during
the second half of December 1946.
At the beginning of 1946 the actual reserve percentages
in effect were 20, 20, and 14 per cent on demand deposits for
central reserve city, reserve city, and country banks respect
ively, and 6 per oent on time deposits for all member banks.
The percentages of demand deposits were at their maximums in
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TABLE IX
TOTAL DEPOSITS OF MEMBER BANKS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE*
AND
ASSUMED PRIMARY REQUIRED RESERVES
(millions of dollars)

Class of Banks and
Federal Reserve Dlst.

Actual
Demand
Deposits
1946

Central Reserve Cities 25,346
Reserve Cities
28,256
Country
23,731

Assumed
Assumed
Actual
Reserves
Reserves
Time
Required Deposits Required
1946
1946
1946
_ _ L 2 L .. ....... ( 3 ± _ .. „ ( 4 L
5,576
6,2 1 6
3,7 97

2,276
1 0 ,8 0 5
13,97 8

182
865
1 ,1 18

TOTALS

2.1 65
15a5.82 .. . 27.05 9
J L B 2
* Averages of Daily Figures for Second Half of December
Source: Columns (1) and (3) Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1947,
p • 168•
Columns (2) and (4), computed by using the reserve percentages
which appear on Page 81, and the actual deposits in Columns
(1) and (3).
reserve city and country banks, and over 66 per cent of the
demand deposits were held in these banks.

The percentages

on time deposits were at their maximums for all banks, and
over 8? per cent of the total time deposits were also held
in reserve city and country banks.

Therefore, if the reserve

requirements of country and reserve city banks could have been
raised, it would have decreased their excess reserves sub
stantially and possibly forced some contraction of bank credit.
Assumed Effects of the Primary Reserve Plan.

It is

assumed that the Federal Reserve Act was amended at the end of
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1945 to permit the Board of Governors to raise primary re
serve requirements to double the maximum ratios permitted
by the Banking Act of 1935*

It is also assumed that the

Board at the beginning of 1946 raised reserve requirements
to the following theoretical percentages:
22 per cent for central reserve city banks on demand

deposits and 8 per cent on ti o deposits.
22 per cent for reserve

and

3 per

cent on time

citybanks

on demanddeposits

deposits.

16 per cent for country banks ondemand deposits
8 per

and

cent on time deposits.
Table 10 on the following page shows the assumed

changes resulting from the increased reserve requirements.
Columns (1), (2), and (3) show total, required, and excess
reserves of member banks during the second half of December,
1946, amounting to 16,567, 15*666, and 901 million dollars
respectively.

Column (4) shows that the assumed required

reserves would have been approximately 17*734 million dollars,
if the primary reserve requirements had boon increased as
proposed above during 1946.

The required reserves presumably

would have increased from 15*666 to 17,754 million dollars, or
2,038 million as a result of the proposed increased require

ments.

It is assumed that the member banks would have carried

TABES X
RESERVES OF MEMBER BANKS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE STSTEM*
AND THE
ASSUMED CHANGES RESULTING FROM PROPOSED INCREASED RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
(millions of dollars)

Actual Reserves * Second
Half of December 192*6

.Assumed Reserves Resulting from Increased
.
Requirements December 192*6
Excess
Deficit Additional Total
Required (W - (1) Required (1) / (6) (7) - (!*:
(6)
(7)
(8)
(5)
<U)

Class of Banks
and Federal
Reserve Districts

Total
(i)

Central Reserve City
Reserve City
Country

5»2!j2
6,528
h,797

5,206
6,299
!»,161

36
229
636

5,758
7,081
li,9l5

- 516
- 553
- 118

/ 552
/ 782 .
/ 75U

.5,79b
.7,310
5,551

36
229
636

TOTALS

16,567

15,666

901

17,75b

-1,187

/2,088

18,655

901

Required
(2)

Excess
(3)

* Averages of Daily Figures,
Sources* (1), (2), and (3) Federal.Reserve Bulletin, 19&7* p♦ 168.
(k) Table 9, Columns (2) / (W, Page 80.
(5>) Computed by subtracting Column (1) from Column (I*).
(6) Approximated figures to conform to the actual excess reserves figures in Column (3).
(7) Computed by adding Columns (1) and (6).
(8) Computed by subtracting Column (2*)from Column (7)*

83
approximately the same excess reserves as they had before
the proposed increased reserve requirements were put in
effect, or approximately 901 million dollars*

The assumed

reserve deficit of member banks at the Reserve Banks would
have been approximately 1,187 million dollars and is shown In
Column (5)•

It is assumed that member banks would have sold

approximately 2,088 million dollars in Government securities
to eliminate the assumed deficit and maintain approximately
the same level of excess reserves as at the end of 1946*
It seems reasonable that the banks would have sold
assets that yielded the least returns*

Under the operations

of the assumed secondary reserve plan, they would have h*& no
excess short-term Government Securities to sell*

Therefore,

they would have sold their long-term Government
The Federal Reserve Banks were required to buy any securities
that the banks would have had to sell*

Therefore, a shift

of 2,088 million dollars of Government securities supposedly
would have occurred between the Reserve Banks and their member
banks*

Column (7) shows the assumed total reserves to be

18,655 million dollars.

This figure was computed by adding

the actual total reserves for the end of 1946 of 16,567
million and the assumed additional reserves of 2,088 million*
Column (8) shows the theoretical excess reserves of 901 million
dollars at the end of 1946*
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The theoretical shift of securities from member banks
to Reserve Banks would have affected the distribution of the
marketable public debt during 1946.

This change in distri

bution of the marketable debt is shown in the accompanying
table on the following page.

Column (1) shows the distribution

of the total marketable debt of 176,658 million dollars at
the end of 1946.

Column (2) shows the assumed shift of the

distribution of 2,088 million dollars of securities from the
commercial banks to the Reserve Banks as a result of the inp

creased reserve requirements. •
The effect of this plan on the.Government security hold
ings of commercial banks of the Reserve System is shown in
Column (3)> Table 7» Page 76.

Only long-term Government

security holdings of the commercial banks wdrse decreased in
Table 7* because the banks were required to hold,a certain
amount of short-term Government securities under the theoret-,
ical secondary reserve plan.

To meet the assumed increase in

reserve requirements presumably they would have sold their
long-term, low-yielding Treasury notes and bonds.

The decrease

2This includes 6,897 commercial banks of the Reserve
System of the total 6,900 member banks. The difference of
three banks were listed as savings banks with less than 15
million dollars in deposits. Therefore, it is assumed that
the increased reserve requirements would affect the reserves
of only the commercial banks of the Reserve System.

t&nm

m

distribuiigm* of marketabie f m u c DEBT

km
THE ASSUMED CHAWGES RESULHiG FROM THE PROPOSED AHT1-INFIAT10BARI PIAH
(millions of dollars)

Assumed Shift in Distribution
in 191*6 Resulting fro®

Type of Holders
of Securities
U# S. Gov’t Agencies
Federal Reserve Banks
Conmiercial Banks
t
Mutual Savings Banks
Insurance Companies
Others
Treasury Credit

Assumed
Assumed
Total
Final
Actuals
Increased Compulsory Increased Changes in
Corporate Distributioj!i Total
foialiWot
Reserve
Savings
Income fax in 191*6 Dec#31,191*6
Bee.31, 191*6 Requirements
Plan
(6)
(3)
(5)
(X)
(2)

m

6,302
23,3*0
66,962
11,*21
2U, 3U6
hit, 177

/2,088
-2,088

285
-3,130

-

87 '
95lt

/ I , 716
-6,172

-1,328
A ,7lt3

~

bOl*

-1,732
A,7U3

6,302
25,066
60,790
11,521
2!t,3it6
i*2,Wi5
U,7U3

TOTAiS
Sources: (X) Federal Reserve Bulletin, 191*7> p. 306,
(2) Table 10, Column (6), Page 82#
(3) Table 12, Column (I*), Page 90.
(It) Computed by assuming a 35 per cent effective yield on total corporate profits# The
description for this column appears on Pages 95 and 96#
(5) Totals of Columns (2), (3), and (U)#
(6) Computed by adding or subtracting the figures of Columns (1) and (5).
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amounted to 23Q million dollars in Treasury notes and 1,858
million in Treasury bonds.3
The principal effects of this measure would have been
(1) to shift 2,088 million dollars of short-term Government
securities from commercial banks to Reserve Banks, and (2) to
reduce the degree of multiple credit expansion that would have
been possible on the basis of any reserves created by the sale
of the assumed 2,088 million dollars of securities to the
Reserve Banks.
III. COMPULSORY SAVINGS PLAN
The concept for the proposed compulsory savings plan
was borrowed from John Maynard Keynes* suggested compulsory
loan plan which appeared In his book. How To Pay For The War,
published in 1940.

The compulsory savings plan as proposed

would have been superimposed upon the tax structure of the
United States at the beginning of 1946.
It is realized that such a measure to be effective
would bear most heavily upon expenditures of the low- and
medium-income groups which account for the most consumption
of goods and services.

Thus it would not conform to the

ability-to-pay tax principle.

With the threat of serious

inflation, however, it would have been generally beneficial
to cut substantially the purchasing power of those income

^The explanation of the distribution of the decrease
in long-term securities appears on page 77.

8?
classes In the “highest propensity to consume."

Such a

reduction of purchasing power during 1946 would have relieved
commo&lty-prlce Inflationary pressures substantially by re
ducing the inequality of demand over supply#

Therefore, the

compulsory savings plan is considered Justifiable from the
socl&l-expedlency standpoint of benefiting society as a whole#
John Maynard Keynes when writing about the compulsory
loan plan in 1940 stated that t

"A general plan like this one

to which all are required to conform is like the rule of the
road, --everyone gains and no one can lose* . . . For the
plan is Intended to prevent people from getting In one another’s
way in spending their money."^
It is not that this plan alone would have controlled
the inflation of the American economy at the beginning of
1946.

However, if it had been used in conjunction with the

other measures suggested in this study, it would have assisted
tremendously in retarding inflation#

In addition to reducing

purchasing power, the government could have used the revenue
secured from the proposed compulsory savings plan to retire
Government securities, and this shift of Government debt
would have acted as a deflationary force*

The total public

debt would not have been reduced because a credit for the

Yorkt

^John Maynard Keynes, How to Fay for the War, (New
Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1940)7 PP* 10-12.#
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amount each Individual loaned to the government would have
been carried in the treasury Department’s accounts*

There

fore, only a shift in the debt would have occurred.

This

part of the debt would have been nonmarketable and nonredeemable hence, It would have been non-inflationary*
The compulsory savings measure has a three-fold pur
pose:

(1) to withdraw purchasing power from individuals

during a time o f ■large demand and small supplies of goods and
services; (2) to defer the spending of individual earnings;
and (3) to return the savings, thus restoring purchasing power
to Individuals during a recession period when more purchasing
power is needed to forestall cumulative deflation.5
Assumed Effects of the Compulsory Savings Plan in 1946.
It is not the intention of the writer to make a detailed study
and analysis of the rates to be Imposed under a compulsory
savings plan, since that would be beyond the scope of this
study.

However, rates are assumed which appear to furnish

a logical way of apportioning the savings to the various in
come groups.
The latest percentages of income received by each
Income class appeared, in the Statistics of Income for 1945
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

^Keynes, Ibid... pp. 10-11.

It Is conjectured that

39
there was little or no change In the percentages of income
received by each group during 1946.

Therefore, to compute

the probable Income received in 1946 by each specific income
group, the estimated total personal income for 1946 of 177*
217 million dollars was divided by the 1945 percentages of
income for the different income classes*

The statistics

as shown in Column (1), Table 12 on the following page indi
cate that the groups with income from §1,500 to §10,000 re
ceived 73*25 per cent of the estimated total personal income
in the United States during 1945*

Therefore, these groups

would be required to supp iy the bulk of the compulsory sav
ings funds during 1946.

The writer believes that the income

groups from §2,000 to §4,000 which recelved43*04 per cent
of the total personal income during 1945, had the largest
"propensity to consume,11 and, therefore, should have been
forced to loan the largest percentage of proposed compulsory
savingB to the government during 1946.
Column (3) of the accompanying table shows the percent
ages of compulsory savings that presumably would have been
derived from each specific income group.

These percentages

are not rates that would have been imposed on each income
class, but are percentages of total personal income that
supposedly would have been loaned by each income group.

For

instance, family exemptions would have been granted under the

TABLE X II

COMPULSORY SAVINGS PLAN

Percentage
Personal
Income
for 19U5

Assumed
Distribution
of Personal
Income
for 191*6

Assumed
• Percentage
Heturn from
Compulsory
Savings
for 191*6

<*>

(2)

(3)

Income Classes
Under

0 500
1,500
2,000
3,000
U,ooo

$

-

$00

1, 500
2,000
3,000
i»,000
5»ooo

5,000 - 10,000
10,000 and over
TOTALS
' Sources? (1)
(2)
(3)
(h)

•

.

13*97

2i215,213
20,!»33il20
18,166,011
U2,177;6U6
3li,096,55l
16,995,110
18,076,131*
21i,757,215

100.00

177,217,000

1.25

11*53

10.2*2
23.80
19*21;
9.59

10.20

.

Assumed
Total Revenue
Resulting from
Compulsory
Savings Plan
for 192*6
(2) x (3) (1*)

20l»,30C369,300
-

1
2
li
1*

3
2
1

1,687,000
1,363,600

509,800
,361,500
21*7,500.

i*,?l*3,000

Statistics of Income for 19U5> Bureau of Internal Revenue, pp. lU-15.
Computed by using percentages of Column (l) and estimated total personal income for 191*6.
Hypothecated by the writer.
Computed by multiplying Column (2) and the percentages of Column (3).
to

©
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proposed compulsory savings plan.

Therefore, a rate of 6

or T per dent on the $2,000 to $4,000 Income class probably
would have been required to return approximately 4 per cent
of the total personal income received by that income group.
The net result of this proposal would have been (1)
to permit the income classes below #500 to maintain their
income intact, (2) to leave the aggregate income of the group
below $2,000 nearly as high as before, (3) to reduce the
aggregate income of the $2,000 to $4,000 income groups most
severely, and (4) to reduce, the aggregate income of the
groups above $4,000, but restrict their aggregate,amount of
Treasury credits to a smaller amount than the lower income
groups.
The total personal income for 1946 was approximately
177*217 million dollars, and using the 1945 percentages of
income distribution for each specific group, the assumed
1946 personal income group distribution was computed and is,
shown in Column (2) of Table 12.

Column (3) shows the per-

centage returns supposedly secured from each income group
under the proposed compulsory savings plan, and Column {4} f.
shows the assumed total revenue of 4,743 million dollars
secured and its distribution, among the specific income
classes.
It is assumed that the Treasury would have used the

.
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4*743 million dollars of additional revenue to retire
Government securities#
of the Government debt#

This would have resulted in a shift
The shift of 4*743 million dollars

from marketable Government securities to the Treasury credit
as a result of the proposed compulsory savings plan* is shown
in Column (3), Table 11* Page 85*

It is assumed that the

reduction of the marketable debt would have been divided as
follows
(1) 6 per cent from the Reserve Bank holdings#
(2) 28 per cent from the holdings of corporations,
and businesses.

(Others)

(3) 66 per cent from commercial bank holdings.
Column (3) Table 11* Page 85, shows that 285 million
dollars of Government securities supposedly would have been

6These percentages were hypothecated by the writer to
conform as closely as possible to the actual changes in the
distribution and reduction of the marketable Government se
curity holdings during 1946. The securities held by U. B*
Government Agencies* mutual savings* banks, and insurance
companies were not assumed to have been reduced by the funds
secured from the theoretical savings plan* because they are
usually long-term permanent security’holders* and to reduce
the holdings of commercial banks* Reserve Banks,, and others
is considered more deflationary. During 1946 the mutual
savings banks and insurance companies actually Increased their
holdings of Government securities by approximately 2,193 mil
lion dollars. An arbitrary plan of reduction had to be
selected by the writer to Indicate the decrease in Government
securities as a result of the proposed compulsory savings
plan* and this method is believed to be reasonable.

retired fro® Reserve Rank lri.pidi.iigs> 3* 130 fro® commercial
battksy'lan^vi^28; million .fro® others.. Presumably there'
would .have■heeu

reduction* in the total marketable debt*

however, a shift of 4*743 million dollars of Government
debt^frp®'.'. commercial hanks , Reserve Banks*- and other hold
ings-to a-nonredeemahle‘and nonmarketable Treasury credit
would have bean accomplished by the proposed compulsory

The assumed; reduction of 3*130 million dollars of
long-term commercial hank-held Government securities is
shown In Oolumn (4)* Table (7, Page ?$*

The decrease of

hank-held debt which reduces hank deposits is generally
considered as deflationary* and for this reason one of the
1

aims of the anti-inflationary.plan-was-to force contraction
of hank-held Government debt.-To dothis some of the meas
ures proposed in this study were designed to create a Treas
ury surplus* or treasury balances to retire Government debt *
The compulsory savings plan would not have created addition
al Treasury surplus#

However* it would have increased

Treasury balances at the He serve Banka so that Government
securities could have been retired from the inflationary
holders, such as commercial banks.

Furthermore* the theor

etical secondary reserve plan would have restricted^*10
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sale of Government securities by the commercial banks to
long-term Treasury notes or bonds.
The cost of administration of the compulsory savings
plan would have been defrayed by the savings in interest
rates on the assumed amount of public debt retired.

The

average interest rate cost of carrying the debt was approx
imately 2 per cent* which would indicate an assumed savings
during 1946 of approximately 94.8 million dollars in inter
est rates on the 4,743 million dollar shift of Government
debt as a result of the savings plan.

However* to make the

proposed plan more attractive to those persons who would
have had to supply the Government with loan funds, it is
suggested that interest at the rate of 1^ per cent would
have been paid on the Treasury credit.

This would have left

the saving of ^ per cent in interest rates to be used to
defray the cost of administration of the proposed savings
plan, or approximately 2.4 million dollars.
IV. INCREASED CORPORATE INCOME TAX
Business during the transition period made unusually
high capital outlays, and this stimulated inflation.

These

capital expenditures competed with individual and government
expenditures for scarce materials, and the incomes generated
in the process of this capital formation exerted pressure on
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scarce su p p lies o f consumer goods*
P ro fe s s o r Louis Shore in December 1948 w rote t h a t :
"In creases in co rp o rate p r o f i t s hare helped
to push th e i n f l a t i o n along# Corporate p r o f it s
a f t e r taxes hare grown from $5 *0 b i l l i o n in 1939
to $8*7 b i l l i o n in 1945 and have more than doubled
ag ain amounting to $18*1 b i l l i o n in 1947* These
la r g e p r o f it s a f t e r tax es hare p e rm itte d payment
o f reco rd amounts o f diTldends and hare a ls o l e f t
la r g e sums a T s ila b le to be plowed back in to cap
i t a l expansion*
"The fa c t th a t business p r o f i t s hare been h ig h
d u rin g th e p ast s e v e ra l years has le d some to th e
co n clu s io n , r e tr o s p e c tiv e ly , th a t i t would be
e a s ie r now to c o n ta in i n f l a t i o n i f th e tax es on
business had been h ig h e r throughout th e war and
t r a n s it io n p e rio d *
They appear to s t r ik e w ith
t e l l i n g fo rc e a t the wisdom o f th e 1945 re p e a l
o f the e x c e s s -p r o flts ta x *
The course o f a c tio n
seemed le s s c le a r , however, in 1946 when emp
h a s is everywhere was on th e need to stren gth en
th e f in a n c ia l re se rv es o f business to accomplish
a speedy reco n versio n o f th e economy from war to
peace p ro d u c tio n *"7
Assumed E ffe c ts o f th e In c re as ed Corporate Income Tax
in 1946•

In 1946 co rp o ra te ta x e s to ta le d ap p ro xim a tely 8 ,6 0 1

m i llio n d o lla r s , o f which 4 ,4 0 0 m i llio n was back excess
p r o f it s ta x e s , and th e rem aining 4 ,8 0 1 m i llio n was co rp o ra te
Income tax es .® T o ta l co rp o ra te p r o f it s and In v e n to ry v a lu a 
t io n adjustm ent f o r 1946 was ap p ro xim ately 16 ,1 5 5 m illio n
d o lla r s , and the estim ated y ie ld o f co rp o ra te income tax es

7shere, op* elt*, pp. 848-860*
6"national Income," Supplement of the Survey o f Current
Business, July 1947, (Washington, 15. C.: tFETtel States Governraent Printing Office, 1 9 4 7 ), pp. 1 9 -8 1 .
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was 26 per cent.

However, If corporate tax rates had been

raised to yield 35 per cent, approximately 5*647 million
dolla?>s would have been secured from corporate income taxes
dux'ing 1946.

Tho total corporate taxes would have been

approximately 10,046 million dollars, under the proposed
increased rates.

Of this, approximately 4,400 million dollars

would have been back excess profits taxes and the remaining
5,647 million would have been secured from the proposed in
creased corporate income taxes.

This is an assumed increase

of 1,445 million dollars*
This proposed increase in corporate income tax rates
would be included in the suggested anti-inflationary plan
described in this chapter and therefore, it is assumed that
Congress at the beginning of 1946 passed an Act authorizing
increases in corporate Income tax rates, so that they would
yield an estimated 35 per cent.

This would have required

increases in the 1945 graduated corporate income tax rates,
by either lowering the corporate profits exemptions or in
creasing the prevailing graduated rates of 21 to 38 per cents.
Presumably the Treasury would have had an additional
1,445 million dollars available in 1946 to retire Government
securities.

Column (4), Table 11, Page 85 shows that the

distribution of the 1,445 million dollar reduction of market
able Government securities would have been 87 million from
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Reserve Bank holdings, 954 million from oommeroial honk
-0*
holdings* and 404 million from others.
This proposed anti-inflationary moasur© Is tho only
proposal suggested In thiq study that would have docreased
the total amount of the public debt*
measures moroly shifted the debt*

The other suggested

Howovor* the proposed in-

creased corporate income tax rates would havo increased Gov
ernment rovenuo during 194d and permitted additional retire
ment of the public debt*
The effect of the proposed plan upon commercial bankheld marketable Government securities is shown In Column (5)$
Table 7„ Page 76*

Approximately 954 million dollars of long

term bank-held marketable Covommont securities presumably
1

would have boon sold by commercial banks to the Treasury*
Tho theoretical secondary reserve plan would have restricted
the sal© of Government securities by tho coraoorcial banks to
long-term Treasury notes or bonds#
V*

ADDXTXOHAL ANTI- XITFLATIO: 1ARY PROPOSALS

It is believed that the measures proposed in this
chapter would, have, retarded substantially postwar monetary
inflation and assisted in tampering conuaodity-prio© infla-

fi

.

The same porcontagos of dobt reduction were usod as
nere describod on page 92.
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tionary pressures.

It is recognized that additional

measures would have been necessary to fully control infla
tion.

therefore, the following measures are suggested to

supplement the fiscal anti-inflationary program?
(1) Regulation of consumer credit*
(2) Regulation of stock-market credit.
(3) Improved price regulation*
(4) A wage stabilization plan.
(5) Allocation of scarce materials*
to attempt a thorough discussion of these additional
measures is beyond the scope of this study.

Only brief ref

erence can be made to these supplemental controls?
\
(1) Consumer credit control wqs continued during most
.

of 1946, but after December 1 Regulation W was revised and
restricted to the regulation of Installment financing of a
relatively few items of sizable unit-cost.

Finally, on

November 1, 1947 the control of consumer credit was dis
continued.
scale,

It was reimposed In August 1948 on a limited

fhe regulation of consumer credit during the entire

postwar period, to restrict consumer purchasing power, would
have been necessary to relieve commodity-price Inflationary
pressures *
(2) Margin requirements were raised to 100 per cent
at the beginning of 1946 by the Board of Governors to force

contraction of stock-market credit *

At the beginning of 1947

they were lowered to 75 per cent in recognition of the abate*
ment of stock-market credit expansion during 1946*

The

N

regulation of credit proposed m
the same or a similar program*

this study would have included
Such control was essential In

the postwar period to restrict the expansion of stock-market
credit *
(3) Price regulation was continued through October
1946.

After November 1, 1946 only sugar* rice and rents

were subjected to control by OPA.

Finally* on lay 31* 1947

OPA expired and sugar control and rationing were transferred
to the Department of Agriculture, and rent control was placed
under the control of the Housing Expediter*^0 At the end of
194Bronly rent control was under Government supervision*
The termination of OPA allowed a rapid rise in prices in
United States during the latter part of 1946 and 1947.

To

help retard commod ity-pr iee inflation, price control should
have been maintained and improved during the postwar period,
to allow a gradual and orderly rise in prices until OPA .could
be terminated without causing sudden and sharp price Increases.
The aim of the proposed price regulation program would have
been a better epst-prioe relationship of all goods under OPA
control•
(4) A postwar wage stabilization plan should have been
■^Twenty-second Quarterly Report of OPA* May 31# 1947*
Washington# p. C.; United States Government Printing Office,
1947), p* i»
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Introduced to retard a wage-prlce spiral, by eliminating
*

wage increases that were not the result of increased pro
ductivity of labor.

Wage Increases without corresponding

increases in productivity merely increase production costs
which* in turn, lead to further price increases.

The wage-

prlce .spiral which occurred during the postwar transition
period could have been at least greatly tempered by a wage
stabilization program.
(5)

During the postwar period there was an unequal

distribution of scarce materials and a number of essential
industries, such as housing, were hampered by the lack of
material available.

Therefore, to eliminate this bottleneck

in the reconversion of the American economy to peacetime pur
suits, the allocation of scarce materials by a Government
Blanning Board would have been included In the postwar antiinflationary program.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY W

CONCLUSIONS

When the Federal Reserve System was created In 1915
It was established "in an era when the monetary problem was
one of soarcity and rigid limitation on expansion; it has
come to operate in an era when the problem is instead one
*

of superabundance and of rigidities in the way of contrac
tion."'1
The original principles drafted by the authors of the
Federal Reserve Act expanded into a control of the cost,
supply, and availability of money*

Only through trial and

error were its most important credit control devices estab
lished.

The principal general instruments through which

Federal Reserve authorities could exercise their powers over
bank credit are discount rate control, open market operations
and changes in reserve requirements.

The Federal Reserve

officials at first considered that their power to raise or
lower discount rates was their moot potent weapon to control
bank credit.

After 1920 discount rat© control was used very

little and open market operations became the dominant power.
As a means of credit expansion, open market operations
and discount rate control are limited by the reserve position

The Federal Reserve System its Purposes and Functions
op. clt .. p. 115*

102
of the Federal Reserve Banks, and at the commercial bank level
by the demand for bank credit#
The last instrument of general credit control, raising
or lowering reserve requirements,

has not been used agreat

deal during the Federal Reserve*s existence*
The first selective instrument of direct control came
into being under the Security Exchange Act in 1934 which
permitted the Federal Reserve authorities to set margin re
quirements for stock-market credit.

The second selective

instrument, consumer credit regulation, was granted to the
Board of Governora in 1942, and authorized direct control over
the expansion of consumer credit during the war.
The Federal Reserve System’s general instruments of
credit control were used sparingly during the defense and
war period because it was necessary to provide banks with easy
access to a volume of reserves sufficient to enable them to
absorb all newly-issued Government securities not taken by
other investors.

In addition a stable market had to be main

tained where the credit needs of the Government and industry
could be satisfied promptly and at low cost.

This method of

financing was inflationary, but it had to be permitted be
cause of the Government*s fiscal requirements.

This situation

existed in the United States at the end of the war:

first,

a volatile situation of an expanding purchasing power and a

shortage of civilian goods which produced heavy inflationary
pressures on the price structuref and second, the huge Gov
ernment debt which had enlarged the deposit currency and
money in circulation to three times the 1940 volume, plus the
fact that commercial banks held over one-quarter of the
Government securities issued *
these monetary and coramodity-price inflationary
pressures were counteracted during the war by direct controls
over demand, supplies and prices of goods, and direct controls
over wages*

Serious inflation was avoided by maintenance of

controls, as well as through the public's exercise of volun
tary restraint and investment of savings in Government secur
ities -

After the war was over, however, the public clamored

for an early lifting of these restraints and a restoration
of the prewar economy.
The program followed by the government to combat
inflation during the transition period consisted of a number
of direct control measures, namely:,

(1) full price regula

tion until November 1946, then decontrol of all items until
only rent ceilings remained at the end of 1948; (2) regula
tion of consumer credit until Hovember 1946, then only
regulation of installment credit under Regulation f, and
finally, complete abandonment of all credit controls in
November 1947 I (3) the resumption of the regulation of

Installment credit on a few durable items in August 1948}
(4)

continued regulation of stock-market credit with 100

per cent margin requirements in effect from Januafy 1946 to
January 1947, and finally, resumption of 75 per cent require
ments, which was in effect at the end of 1948; and (5) the
ratios of reserve requirements were not changed except for
increases in requirements on demand deposits in central re
serve city banks until the anti-inflationary bill passed
by Congress in August 1948 permitted the ratios to be raised
to 30, 24, and 18 per cent on demand deposits for central
reserve city, reserve city, and country banks respectively,
and to 7^ per cent on time deposits for all member banks*
Oh September 16, 1948 the Board raised reserve requirements
on demand deposits to 26, 22 and 16 per cent for central
reserve city, reserve city, and country banks respectively,
and to 7§ per cent on time deposits for all member banks*
An Indirect measure, which maintained a mild squeeze
on bank credit during the postwar period, was the Treasury
debt-retirement program accomplished by the use of excess
Federal revenue over expenditure to retire Government
securities *
The anti-inflationary proposals of the Board of Gov
ernors of the Federal ^ s e r v e System in its 1945 Annual
Report, were designed to help restore the System’s capacity
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to exert an over-all restraint on undue expansion of bank
credit*

The primary reserve plan would have effected a

shift of a certain amount of short-term Government securities
from commercial Banks to Federal Reserve Banks and reduced
the ratio of multiple credit expansion on the basis of a
given amount of reserves*

The plan would have discouraged

further purchases of long-term issues or increased lending
by banks, while the Federal Reserve prevented short-term
interest rates on Government securities from rising above a
level determined by the Treasury Department.
The secondary reserve plan would have forced commercial
banks to retain substantial holdings of short-term Government
securities, while limiting their ability to sell these secur
ities to the Reserve Banks to increase their reserves and
expand their lending power.
The bond limitation plan would have limited the amount
of long-term marketable securities, both public and private,
that any commercial bank could hold against its demand depos
its.

Therefore, the banks would have had to shift their

portfolios, but there was no guarantee that they would have
bought short-term Government securities to conform to this
plan.
The primary reserve and secondary reserve plans were
considered effective measures for combating inflation and
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were Included in the proposed anti-inflationary plan dis
cussed in this study*
The anti-inflationary measures proposed by Professors
Sumner Sliehter and Alvin Hansen of Harvard University in
1946 were designed to combat commodity-price inflation with
direct and selective controls, such as prico regulation,
consumer credit regulation, and allocation of scarce mater
ials.

The two professors considered voluntary measures

adequate to retard monetary inflation of the economy*

It is

believed that voluntary measures to retard monetary inflation
are not applicable to the economy in a country like the United
States where competition is keen.

Consequently, only the

commodity-price Inflationary measures suggested by Professors
Sliehter and' Hansen were included in the proposed anti-infla
tionary plan discussed in this study.
The Federal Reserve System was restricted in its
capacity to help retard inflation after the end of World War
II because it was faced with the twofold responsibility of t
(1) fulfilling its new responsibilities of assuring reason
able stability in the prices of the large volume of Government
securities outstanding; and (2) at the same time preventing
speculative or otherwise excessive expansion of bank credit.
The general Instruments of credit control.of the
Reserve System could be used only sparingly to assist in
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retarding postwar Inflation*

The reserve requirements were

at their maximum ratios In all districts except the central
reserve cities, and to raise requirements in these districts
would have had very little effect upon excess reserves, be
cause the bulk of reserves and deposits were carried in'
reserve city and country banks*

Changes in the discount

rates would have h&d little significance in restricting bank
lending because only a small amount of paper was being dis
counted at Reserve Banks during the postwar period*
The open market operations of the Reserve Banks
probably could not have forced contraction of bank lending at
the beginning of 1946 because approximately 230 billion
dollars of publicly-held redeemable debt was outstanding
and the Reserve Banks had been pledged to prevent widely
fluctuating Interest rates to assure a reasonably stable
Government security market.

Refusal of the Reserve Banks to

purchase these securities or any attempt to sell additional
amounts to absorb more bank reserves would have subjected
the public debt to wide fluctuations in interest rates.
The System during the postwar period made use of its
power to determine margin requirements for purchasing listed
corporate securities.

It maintained, with some adjustments

and revisions, Its wartime control over consumer credit,
until such regulation was ended by legislative action.

These

selective measures resulted In a significant contraction In
'bank'credit for carrying securities, and the expansion of
consumer credit was restrained somewhat.

On th© whole,

Federal Beserve powers were insufficient to prevent, inflation
from enveloping the economy during the postwar transition
period..
The monetary inflationary program proposed in this
study was designed (1) to decrease the amount of bank-held
Government securities or shift them to less inflationary
\

holders, (2) to keep the cost of carrying the public debt
as low as possible and at the same time retard debt moneti
zation, and (3) to reduce or halt the increase of purchasing
power of Individuals and corporations*
The most important measure to effect a shift of bankheld Government securities to less inflationary holders is
the proposed increase in primary reserve requirements.

This

proposal would have forced member banks in 1946 to sell
approximately 2,088 million dollars in long-term Government
securities to the Reserve Banks.

This assumed shift of

securities.from member banks to the less inflationary Reserve
Bank holdings would also have reduced the degree of multiple
credit expansion that would have been possible on th© basis
of the 2,088 million dollar Increase in member bank reserves.
The proposed compulsory savings plan would have

created approximately 4*743 million dollars in treasury
balances to permit additional retirement of marketable
Government debt*

It is.assumed that approximately 66 per

cent of the retirement would have come from the holdings of
commercial banks# !Therefore, approximately 3,130 million
dollars' of Government securities would have been retired
from commercial bank holdings as a result of the proposed
compulsory savings plan*
The proposed Increase in corporate income tax rates ♦
would have increased the yield Of the tax by approximately
1*445 million dollars*

It is assumed that this additional

revenue would have been used by the Government to retire
marketable Government securities* of which approximately
954 million dollars presumably

yjouM

have been secured from

commercial bank holdings*
The proposed anti-inflationary plan thus would have

.

effected retirement, or a shift from commercial banks to less
Inflationary holders of approximately 6,172 million dollars
of marketable Government securities during 1946*

The reduct

ion of commercial bank-held securities from 66,962 million
dollars to 60,790 million is shown on Table tt>, Page &6.

Such

a substantial reduction is considered by the writer to havebeen adequate to retard or temper inflationary pressures
during 1946 *

$able 10# Page $2 shews that the public debt presum
ably would have been reduced by approximately 1*445 million
dollars*

However# in addition to this reduction, a shift

would have been accomplished of approximately 6*831 million
dollars In Government securities from inflationary holders
to less inflationary holders* namely# the Treasury credit
and Federal Heserve Banks.

Therefore* a total of approxi

mately 8*276 million dollars of Government securities would
have been affected by the proposed measures described above.
(#1*445 million from the increased corporate taxes-%ji #4,743
million from compulsory savings plan * #2,088 million from
the increased reserve ,requirements - #8*276 million*)

The

writer believes that this reduction and shift of Government
securities indicates that a definite restraint of monetary
inflationary pressures would have been accomplished during
1946 had these measures been adopted*
In addition* the proposed secondary reserve plan
would have retarded debt monetization by requiring commercial
banks to hold a reserve of approximately 18*489 million
dollars of short-term Government securities against their
demand deposits.

Presumably this would have created a def

inite market for approximately 18*489 -pillion dollars of the
total 36,356 million of short-term marketable securities
issued by the Federal Government. The interest rates would

Ill
have been kept low and the Government security prices
stabilized.

The compulsory savings plan would have had the addi
tional anti-inflationary affect of reducing purchasing power
of individuals during a time of large demand and Inadequate
supplies.

Table 12, Column (4), Page 90 shows that approx

imately 3*050 million dollars or 64.3 per cent of the total
4,743 million compulsory savings secured by the Federal
Government would have been supplied by the 12,000 to §4,000
income groups, which are believed by the writer to have the.
'"highest propensity to consume” in the American economy..

It

is, therefore, concluded that this measure would have tempered
commodity-price Inflationary pressures during 1946 consider
ably .
The conclusions drawn from the discussion of antiinflationary measures proposed in this study are that the
fiscal anti-inflationary program, if .used in conjunction with
the proposed commodity-price anti-inflationary measures, and
carried on during the postwar transition period, presumably
would have restricted the Inflation of the American economy,
so that the gains in “real income” and the standard of living
secured by the American people during the defense and war
periods would have been retained in large part*

In other

words, inflation would have been tempered and retarded*
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